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LETTER FROM THE CO-EDITORS
On behalf of CSCAP, we are 
pleased to present the CSCAP 
Regional Security Outlook 
(CRSO) 2016. Inaugurated in 
2007, this is the ninth annual 
CRSO volume. 
The CRSO brings expert analysis 
to bear on critical security issues 
facing the region and points to 
policy-relevant alternatives for 
Track One (official) and Track 
Two (non-official) to advance 
multilateral regional security 
cooperation. 
The views in the CRSO 2016 
do not represent those of 
any Member committee or 
other institution and are the 
responsibility of the individual 
authors and the Editor. Charts 
and images in the CRSO 2016 do 
not necessarily reflect the views of 
the chapter authors.
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3The Outlook for Security in the Asia Pacific: 
Uncertain
Ron Huisken
The assessments assembled in 
this volume broadly confirm the 
judgement that the Asia Pacific 
continued over the past year to 
deplete its most precious asset: 
the confident expectation that 
the region could preserve order 
and stability while managing 
a strategic transformation of 
historic proportions. The resolve 
of governments, the influence of 
robust bilateral political, economic 
and security relationships and the 
authority of regional multilateral 
processes have failed to prevent the 
further erosion of the security order 
and a matching intensification of 
military posturing, partnering for 
security purposes and the like. 
The states of the region are still 
spending a lot of time in dialogue but 
along critical channels the degree of 
engagement, communication and 
understanding appears to have 
encountered sharply diminishing 
returns. 
The spreading concern about the 
security environment in the region 
means that it is incumbent on 
analysts to avoid simply joining in 
and strengthening a bandwagon 
that in itself could make troubling 
outcomes more likely. The sobering 
aspect of recent trends is that it is 
certainly not confined to the media 
but extends to political circles in 
most states of the region (including 
President Obama, quoted in the 
CSCAP Regional Security Outlook 
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
700
650
600
550
500
450
400
350
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
U
S$
bi
lli
on
Military expenditure trends 1990–2012
Source: Adapted from SIPRI yearbooks; US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers; IISS Military Balance.
Year
ASEAN
ROK
INDIA
JAPAN
CHINA
USA
42015). For the first time in 10 years, 
the 2015 risk assessment prepared 
for the World Economic Forum 
listed ‘interstate war’ as the most 
likely of the risks that could have 
a significant negative impact on the 
global economic outlook.1 Further, 
some of the world’s most respected 
academics are expressing concern, 
most recently Graham Allison, 
Director of the Belfer Center for 
Science and International Affairs 
at Harvard and, in the past, the 
author of a seminal work on the 
1962 Cuban missile crisis. Allison 
has written that war between the 
US and China is “more likely than 
is recognized at the moment.”2The 
sense one has is not of imminent 
war but of a wearing down of the 
margin of safety, the room for error 
and the capacity to absorb shocks 
that we could regret in the future.
The United States and China are 
at the core of this adverse trend. 
China, it would appear, remains 
of the view that the established 
powers continue to resist and 
frustrate China’s achievement of 
policy objectives that are legitimate 
and reasonable given its growing 
strategic weight and influence 
in regional and global affairs. 
The US, for its part, is no longer 
reticent about acknowledging 
either China’s substantive capacity 
to challenge America’s role and 
status in the Indo Asia Pacific or 
its determination to do so. The 
US appears to have become more 
resigned to the likelihood that 
achieving a stable co-existence 
with a powerful China will involve 
a prolonged period of geo-political 
contestation.  The events of the past 
year have confirmed this underlying 
trend rather emphatically. 
Fortunately, President Xi’s first 
state visit to the US in September 
2015 went reasonably well.  The two 
leaders were serious and cordial, 
while giving little outward sign of 
genuine rapport.  They sustained 
their strong posture on climate 
change, reached an important 
agreement on managing air-to-air 
encounters and strengthened their 
commitment on state-sponsored 
economic cybertheft.  Xi and Obama 
tried to tackle the latter issue in 
Sunnydale, California in 2013 
and agreed to set up a bilateral 
working group within the annual 
high-level Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue. From the American 
perspective, however, the problem 
did not diminish. President Obama 
resorted to simple and public 
exhortations to alert Beijing to the 
disproportionate damage the cyber 
activities attributed to China were 
doing to official and public attitudes 
toward China and the mounting 
pressure he faced to take counter-
vailing steps. American officials also 
insisted that advances in tracing 
hackers had long since striped cyber 
theft of political anonymity and, 
for all practical purposes, of legal 
anonymity as well, that is, that the 
US had very precise information on 
where and who.  
In Washington, the two leaders 
agreed that neither side would 
‘conduct or condone’ such activities, 
with Obama adding that the 
US would be very serious about 
verifying compliance. On the other 
hand, Xi’s proposal to work toward 
a new model of major country 
relations remained at the level of 
abstract, motherhood assertions 
well removed from the attitudes 
and perceptions driving the actual 
conduct of the two parties. As the 
four essays on this theme make 
clear, in the absence of a deeper 
understanding on strategic intent 
and clearer thinking on how 
changed behavior would play out in 
the real world, this initiative may 
have already run its course. 
Beijing was managing the launch 
of its popular Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank, had proposals 
in play for enhanced land and 
maritime trade routes that it 
wanted to call new ‘Silk Roads’ and 
was assigning major prominence to 
an amalgamation of these proposals 
in the ‘One Belt, One Road’ concept. 
Beijing also quietly launched a 
carefully pre-planned program to 
develop seven submerged features 
in the Sprately Group in the South 
China Sea into artificial islands, 
some large enough to dock ships or 
operate medium-sized fixed wing 
aircraft.  This program surged 
rapidly into a frantic, large-scale 
operation that, in the age of satellite 
photography, gradually pushed 
the rest of Beijing’s foreign and 
security policy agenda off centre 
stage and into the shadows. By the 
time China declared in June 2015 
that the program was approaching 
completion the political climate 
in the Asia Pacific had become 
noticeably colder and more 
complicated.  
The majority of ASEAN states, 
together with the US and Japan, 
appeared to signal new resolve to 
deny Beijing any significant and 
enduring strategic gains from this 
pre-emptive move.  The US pointedly 
flew maritime surveillance aircraft 
close to the new islands and several 
naval exercises were conducted in 
the area (Japan–Philippines; US–
Philippines; and China). ASEAN 
leaders and Foreign Ministers 
issued statements that described 
this lightning transformation of the 
Sprately Island group as having “…
eroded trust and confidence and 
may undermine peace, security 
and stability in the South China 
Sea”.3 Beijing’s public diplomacy 
on the episode was something of a 
tangle, ranging from pugnacious 
statements that it could do whatever 
it wanted with its possessions in the 
South China Sea, through claiming 
that it was doing no more than other 
claimants had already done, to 
the assertion that the new islands 
would enable China to be a better 
neighbor in the area. The crisis 
was eventually eased through the 
by-now familiar diplomatic device 
of China and ASEAN agreeing to 
5comply with the non-binding 2002 
Declaration on a Code of Conduct in 
the South China Sea and promising 
to accelerate their interminable 
negotiations on a binding set of 
rules for this arena. 
Beijing has carefully and discreetly 
protected the option of using the 
new islands to introduce new 
military capabilities to the South 
China Sea. This will further 
ensure that this issue will become 
imbedded as a source of controversy 
and instability.
In 2014, one of the more prominent 
concerns fueling pessimism about 
the regional security outlook was 
the enduring rift between China and 
Japan, especially the fact that years 
were slipping by without a face-to 
face leaders meeting. That stand-off 
seemed to end at the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
summit in Beijing in November 
2014, although both President Xi 
and Prime Minister Abe made it 
abundantly clear that they were not 
overjoyed. Early in the new year, 
the foreign ministers of China, 
Japan and South Korea conducted 
a positive meeting that seemed to 
promise further engagement at the 
leaders level. These hopes faded 
and, by mid-2015, it was also clear 
that the 70th anniversary of Japan’s 
surrender would not constitute a 
circuit breaker.  Expectations for 
Abe’s much anticipated speech on 
the anniversary shrank to hopes 
that he would not step back from 
earlier expressions of remorse 
and responsibility. China, for its 
part, elected to go ahead with the 
traditional—but rather lavishly 
spectacular—military parade, 
rather than a more subdued 
commemoration of this milestone. 
Shortly thereafter, Japan’s 
enactment—in the face of strong 
public and political opposition—of 
legislation to allow a constrained 
right to collective defence and to 
allow the Japan Self-Defense Force 
(JSDF) to assist an ally even when 
Japan itself was not under direct 
attack, provided further signals 
that the region would continue to 
look back rather than start to build 
a reliably different future.  Despite 
these ongoing stresses, there 
were indications that a trilateral 
summit (China, Japan and South 
Korea) might still be agreed for late 
October or November 2015.
The reconstruction of the China-
Japan relationship is a critical 
piece of business that remains on 
the regional agenda. These two 
countries, in particular, need to 
think carefully not only about 
whether Japan’s actions can 
credibly be seen as a revival of 
militarism, but also about why 
the Abe government has been 
prepared to incur severe, possibly 
even fatal, political injury to secure 
these qualified amendments to the 
role of the JSDF. Opinions vary 
rather widely on where the balance 
of responsibility for the current 
impasse should be located but there 
can be no doubt that both sides have 
work to do to jettison the baggage of 
the past and define the options for 
the future. 
Further evidence of a perceived 
deficit in the region’s capacity to 
cope peacefully with current and 
expected future stresses has been the 
continued attractiveness of hedging 
against the current order being 
up to the task. A political appetite 
for new or the further qualitative 
enhancement of recently established 
security ties remained evident 
across the region. Beyond the formal 
US alliance (with Japan, Republic 
Of Korea, Australia, New Zealand, 
the Philippines and Thailand), the 
countries that added in some way 
to the thicket of security linkages 
in the region included India and the 
US; India and Japan; Japan and the 
Philippines; Japan and Vietnam; 
Japan and Australia; Australia and 
South Korea; and Vietnam and the 
US. China has a single formal ally, 
the Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea, but has active security 
relationships with Pakistan, 
Russia, Vietnam, Myanmar, 
Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka 
and its four central Asian partners 
in the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization. Russia, too, is seeking 
to remind everyone that it is an Asia 
Pacific power, despite its prevailing 
economic difficulties and a current 
politico-strategic agenda focused 
heavily to the west of the Urals. 
If it is accepted that a special 
effort should be made to arrest the 
on-going erosion of the security 
Chinese President Xi Jinping during a Military Parade at Tiananmen Square, Beijing, 
September 3 2015, to Mark the 70th Anniversary of Victory over Japan and the End of World 
War II. Source: Xijingpingoffice Instagram.
6order in the Asia Pacific and shift 
the trend of events onto a more 
positive trajectory, who might take 
the lead and what could they seek 
to accomplish? It cannot be said 
that the region lacks opportunities 
for leaders and the key figures for 
foreign affairs, trade, and defence 
to address concerns and intentions, 
identify common interests, resolve 
or reconcile differences and so 
on.  It is true that, at the level of 
leaders, the APEC summit is not 
optimized to address the security 
agenda while the East Asia 
Summit is still growing into an 
institution capable carrying this 
formidable responsibility let alone 
being accepted by key leaders as 
the forum in which they must and/
or want to address the region’s 
primary security issues. On the 
whole, however, it is hard to argue 
that a basic deficiency is a lack 
of opportunities for key decision 
makers to meet and address the big 
issues confronting the region. In 
addition, China and the US, have 
a sufficiency of regular bilateral 
meetings—from formal and 
informal summits, through their 
annual cabinet-level Strategic and 
Economic Dialogue, to meetings—
on-demand between key principals. 
This also means, of course, that 
these two countries are not 
likely to be the source of a drive 
toward a new security narrative 
for the region. If circumstances 
are considered to be sufficiently 
worrying or are deemed to have 
the potential to reach such depths, 
interrupting an adverse trajectory 
and inviting consideration of more 
positive alternatives is a challenge 
that may fall to the region’s so-
called ‘middle powers’.  This is not 
a challenge to be lightly proposed 
or accepted.  Canvassing regional 
concerns and remedies, and 
reflecting them with integrity as the 
inspiration behind a novel approach 
or process that would attract the 
earnest engagement of the US and 
China is no trivial undertaking. 
The country or countries involved 
will have to find the right political 
and bureaucratic personnel, give 
them sufficient time to gauge 
and evaluate regional attitudes, 
devise a plausible fresh approach 
and consider the most effective 
means of giving the new approach 
traction.  The scope to appear as 
some combination of biased, naive, 
unimaginative and incompetent is 
considerable. But it may be prudent 
for states like South Korea and 
Australia to discreetly engage in 
preparatory discussions on such an 
initiative.
Ron Huisken
Adjunct Associate Professor, 
Strategic & Defence Studies Centre
The Australian National University.
1  “Global Risks 2015”, 10th Edition, World 
Economic Forum, 2015.
2  Graham Allison, “The Thucydides Trap: 
Are the US and China Headed for War?”, 
The Atlantic, 24 September 2015.
3 These words appear in the ASEAN 
Summit Chairman’s Statement, 27 April 
2015 and the ASEAN Foreign Ministers 
Joint Communique, 4 August 2015. 
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The Pivot:  
A Sound Policy in Need of Serious Repair
Michael J. Green
President Barack Obama’s pivot/
rebalance to Asia is neither 
as transformational as the 
administration claims, nor as 
short-lived as allies in the region 
fear.   In July 2015 the Center 
for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS) published the 
results of a survey of regional 
strategic elites in which an average 
of 79 percent of respondents 
across Asia welcomed the goal of 
the pivot/rebalance, 51 percent 
thought it was poorly resourced 
and implemented, but 57 percent 
nevertheless thought that the 
United States would continue to 
lead the definition of order and 
power in Asia over the coming 
decades.1 That sounds about right. 
President Obama came to office 
with unique experiences in Asia 
and the Pacific, but generally 
built on policies established by 
his predecessor, including the 
trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 
realignment of US forces in the 
region, the pursuit of stable 
relations with China, and the 
continued strengthening of alliance 
relations.  The initial spin of his 
White House political advisors 
notwithstanding, the United States 
had never left Asia during the Bush 
administration.  In fact, the Chicago 
Council on Global Affairs found 
in its 2008 survey of soft power 
in Asia that publics in the region 
thought the United States had 
increased its soft power influence 
over the previous decade more than 
any other power, including China.2 
Yet Obama also added new pillars 
to American engagement in the 
region, including participation in 
the East Asia Summit and a more 
active diplomacy in Southeast Asia. 
Moreover, since 2011 polls have 
demonstrated that the American 
public now for the first time identifies 
Asia as the most important region 
in the world to US interest, while 
the 2014 CSIS survey found that 96 
percent of American foreign policy 
experts surveyed supported the 
pivot/rebalance –regardless of their 
party affiliation.  In other words, the 
increased American focus on Asia 
and the Pacific is likely to continue 
beyond the Obama administration.
That said, American policy in 
Asia will continue to require 
serious attention under the 
next administration.  It would 
be a mistake to either praise or 
bury the pivot.  Instead the next 
President will have to add clarity 
and purpose in five areas.
Strategic conceptualization
Pivoting to Asia is not really 
a strategy.  Strategy requires 
identification of ends, ways 
and means—something the 
administration has failed to do in 
any consistent or coherent way 
for years now.  The term “pivot” 
was introduced in Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton’s November 
2011 Foreign Policy Magazine 
article and was then elaborated 
on in President Obama’s speech 
before the Australian Parliament 
in Canberra on November 17.  By 
2012, it was relabeled as America’s 
“rebalance” to Asia in the 2012 
Defense Strategic Guidance.  Prior 
8to those brief declarations that 
the United States intended to 
pay more attention to the region, 
there was no hint of the strategy. 
The Administration’s May 2010 
National Security Strategy made no 
reference to a refocus on Asia and 
articulated no objectives for the 
region as a whole, lumping China 
into a section on engaging “Other 
21st Century Centers of Influence” 
and Asian allies after North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization in a section 
emphasizing the need to “Ensure 
Strong Alliances”.  A survey of 
speeches on the rebalance to Asia 
by principals in the administration 
demonstrates constantly shifting 
and often contradictory priorities.3 
The administration’s vision of 
order in Asia has shifted from 
vowing to respect “core interests” 
with China in the November 
2009 Obama summit with Hu 
Jintao; to listing China as a threat 
alongside Iran in the January 2012 
Strategic Guidance; to welcoming 
Xi Jinping’s proposal for a “New 
Model of Great Power Relations” 
in 2013, before walking away from 
that formulation because allies 
were concerned at the emergence 
of a bipolar condominium forming 
with Beijing at their expense.
The next administration should not 
reject the rebalance, but rather, 
articulate clearly and consistently 
the order the United States seeks to 
shape in Asia.  The most successful 
and sustainable concept will be one 
centered unequivocally on allies 
with a priority on securing a rules-
based order where smaller states 
are not coerced and cooperation 
with China is a means to that end 
rather than an end in itself. 
Willpower and defense 
resources
Rebalancing to Asia will not be 
credible if the larger relative share 
of defense resources is coming 
out of a shrinking pie and the 
president is not willing to contest 
challenges to the prevailing order. 
It is important that the US Navy 
has pledged to go from deploying 
50 percent of its fleet in the Pacific 
to 60 percent.  The Chief of Naval 
Operations also deserves credit 
for already reaching roughly the 
58 percent mark.  However, the 
Administration’s unwillingness to 
fight for the Secretary of Defense’s 
budget proposals and the passive 
reaction to sequestration and the 
budget impasse with Congress have 
seriously damaged the credibility 
and operational sustainability of the 
rebalance.  The White House was 
obviously unhappy when Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Katrina McFarland, told the press 
in April 2014 that because of budget 
pressures, “the pivot is being looked 
at again, because candidly, it can’t 
happen”.4  She revealed the serious 
nature of the challenges.  The 
current defense budget trajectories 
will make it extremely difficult 
to invest in forward presence 
and the so-called “Third Offset” 
needed to develop technologies 
that counter ballistic missile and 
other asymmetrical threats to US 
forces and American allies.  With 
leadership, the next President can 
eliminate the sequestration threat 
in Congress and set the budget on 
a more predictable and effective 
trajectory.
Willpower also matters.  When 
President Obama suddenly 
reversed his pledge to use force 
against Syria for chemical weapons 
use in September 2013, there were 
shudders among national security 
officials in Tokyo and Seoul.  The 
Administration’s obvious hesitation 
to order Freedom of Navigation 
operations or other measures in the 
face of China’s rapid construction 
of four 3000 meter military-spec 
airfields on features in the South 
China Sea has also raised concerns. 
While it is true that these military 
facilities would be easy targets in a 
conflict, that is not true with respect 
to the gray zone coercion short of 
war, or in terms of the forces the 
United States would have to devote 
to the problem in an already complex 
operational environment inside the 
First Island Chain.  The challenge 
for the next President will be how 
to restore confidence in American 
willpower without exacerbating 
security tensions in the region. 
Future engagement of ASEAN
The administration deserves 
credit for stepping up its game 
in Southeast Asia.  There was 
considerable debate in the White 
House about whether joining the 
East Asia Summit might undermine 
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC), but Indonesia helped 
to solve the problem by aligning 
the Bali summit with APEC on 
the calendar in 2011.  Secretary 
Clinton also compensated for the 
inconsistent attendance of the 
Clinton and Bush administrations 
in the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF) and removed an irritant 
in US relations with ASEAN 
by engaging Myanmar just as 
President U Thein Sein was ready 
to undertake reforms on his own. 
The demand signals from Southeast 
Asia for more US engagement in 
the wake of Chinese assertiveness 
were important, but it was also the 
case that the Administration saw 
the strategic opportunity and took 
it.
The problem is that all the easy 
work is now over.  Growing 
political crises in Thailand and 
Malaysia and the reversal of 
opening and reconciliation in 
Burma/Myanmar leave the next US 
administration with hard choices. 
The Administration also appears 
less energetically engaged as new 
more Euro-centric leadership has 
taken over at the State Department. 
Perhaps most troubling, the effort 
to support multilateral diplomatic 
engagement in EAS and ARF 
9on the territorial issues in the 
South China Sea is becoming 
increasingly irrelevant as Beijing 
takes unilateral steps to solidify 
its control over the so-called Nine 
Dash Line.  
The ticking North Korean 
problem
The Administration has declared 
a policy of “strategic patience” 
on North Korea—neither 
investing credibility in high level 
negotiations like the Agreed 
Framework and Six Party Talks, 
nor significantly increasing 
pressure on Pyongyang.  The lack 
of engagement is entirely justified 
by Pyongyang’s provocations and 
declaration of nuclear weapons 
status in 2012.  Meanwhile, the 
Obama Administration has done a 
creditable job aligning diplomatic 
policies and counter-provocation 
plans with Seoul.  
However, Pyongyang has also 
used this period to continue 
work on uranium and plutonium 
based weapons and long-range 
delivery systems.  Many experts 
expect a major missile test on 
the anniversary of the Korean 
Workers Party with a nuclear test 
to follow on October 10.  Strategic 
patience will not be a sustainable 
framework for much longer.  The 
United States should have shifted 
to more proactive interdiction and 
sanctions policies some time ago, 
and will likely have to do so in the 
coming years.  How this will be 
combined with diplomacy depends 
on a number of variables, including 
North Korea’s stance, but America 
will have a stronger grasp of the 
issues if progress can be made on 
the fractured Japan-Korea ties.
Trans-Pacific Partnership
Obama campaigned against trade 
agreements and was then very 
slow to make the public case for 
Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) 
and the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) with the Congress and the 
American people after being elected. 
With the Republican victory in 
Congressional elections in 2014, 
the administration began doing 
the hard domestic political work of 
rallying support for the agreements 
(which require Republican votes) 
and passed the TPA in 2015. 
Whether there is enough time left 
on the American political calendar 
(not to mention all the other 
partners’ political calendars) for 
the TPP remains to be seen, but 
an agreement and even ratification 
in the US Congress still seem 
possible by the end of the Obama 
administration.  The credibility 
of the pivot will rise or fall on this 
outcome.  Now that the TPP has come 
into force in October 2015, the next 
administration will need to pick up 
work on the complementary parts 
of trans-Pacific economic strategy, 
including the largely moribund 
Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) 
negotiations with Beijing and an 
economic cooperation formula for 
the ASEAN states not in TPP. If 
TPP fails, the next administration 
will have a very large hole to dig out 
of before it can restore confidence in 
the American commitment to free 
trade and economic engagement in 
Asia.
More work to be done, but 
much to work with
The 2014 CSIS survey of regional 
strategic elites found that a 
plurality of respondents across 
the region viewed continuous US 
leadership as preferable to the 
alternatives (Sino-centrism, a US-
China condominium, a multipolar 
balance of power, or multilateral 
institutionalism).5 Despite the 
conceptual, resource and diplomatic 
flaws in the pivot, the next 
administration will likely have 
strong foundations for expanded 
engagement with Asia and the 
Pacific, including an American 
public more focused on the region 
and a region now more focused on 
the United States.
Michael J. Green
Senior Vice President for Asia and 
Japan Chair, Center for Strategic 
and International Studies;
Associate Professor, Georgetown 
University.  
1 Michael J. Green, Nicholas Szechenyi, et. 
al., Power and Order in Asia: A Survey of 
Regional Expectations (Center for Strate-
gic and International Studies, Washing-
ton, DC, July) 2014.
2 Christopher B. Whitney et. al., Soft 
Power in Asia: Results of a 2008 Multina-
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The Security Landscape in East Asia:  
A Justifiable Anxiety? 
Zha Daojiong
While alarm and pessimism 
intensifies, assessments of the East 
Asian regional security landscape 
are a matter of perspective.  The year 
2015 marks the 70th anniversary of 
the Second World War, as well as the 
establishment of the United Nations. 
Major power relations, many would 
argue, are still in disarray.  The 
foreign policy establishments in 
Beijing and Washington struggle to 
produce credible reassurance from 
presidential summits, with the first 
state visit by Chinese President 
Xi Jinping to the United States in 
September.  Both Beijing and Tokyo, 
again, failed to commemorate the end 
of the end of the Second World War. 
On a daily basis, media headlines 
announce rising tensions—coupled 
with television images of warships 
and planes of China, Japan, and the 
United States “showing the flag”—
in the East and South China seas. 
In addition, North Korea tests the 
patience of virtually every nation 
concerned about its displays of 
rage.  The general message is clear: 
East Asia is fast becoming a more 
unpredictable and dangerous region.
A less alarmist picture can also 
be drawn: peace is prevailing 
throughout the East Asian region. 
This is possible when we define peace 
as the absence of active warfare; 
either between two countries 
or involving a larger number of 
states or their proxies.  Realities 
on the ground are such that East 
Asia has fared far better than the 
Middle East or Eastern Europe, 
especially in the past decade.  While 
the state of affairs in the Middle 
East and Ukraine is a low bar to 
benchmark East Asia against, it 
is noteworthy that for a region as 
historically complex and politically 
dynamic as East Asia, no-war is a 
significant accomplishment.  This 
suggests that East Asian resilience 
is not just a phenomenon to be self-
congratulatory about, but should in 
fact be fostered through pursuing 
cooperation.
‘Trust’ is a frequent buzzword 
in discussions about managing 
security dynamics across East 
Asia. But trust is hard to define 
or characterize. An emphasis on 
trust can quickly lead to difficulties 
in identifying steps to follow.  On 
the one hand, trust can motivate 
thinking toward sensitivity 
in relation to other countries. 
Hopefully, such sensitivity can 
help encourage symmetry in acts 
of diplomacy.  One the other hand, 
reference to trust could well turn 
out to be an excuse for refusing to 
explore alternative.  Worse still, 
highlighting the lack of trust can 
serve to endorse putting the blame 
on others for the ongoing state of 
affairs.  In short, it may be wiser for 
commentators to acknowledge that 
trust and cooperation is in reality 
another chicken versus egg puzzle.
Viewed objectively, East Asia seems 
to be a bastion of stability. Why 
then all the anxiety? One powerful 
mindset, and perhaps the main 
culprit, is a simplistic vision of the 
US in decline and China on the 
rise, and its corollary: the time for 
countries to choose between them 
as the ultimate security guarantor 
is drawing near.  This image feeds 
the fear that the postwar Pax 
Americana in Asia is crumbling, and 
will inevitably be replaced by a fierce 
Darwinian power struggle between 
the United States and China.  Over-
US Secretary of State John Kerry with Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang at the US-China 
Strategic and Economic Dialogue, Washington, 24 June 2015. Source: US Department of 
State, flickr.
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confident Chinese commentators 
fall into jingoism.  American 
observers leap to the conclusion 
that China is maneuvering to upset 
the US-led hub-and-spoke regional 
security arrangements and, by 
extension, the global order.  Such 
a simplification is so powerful 
that even establishment of the 
multilateral Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank is depicted as an 
unmistakable indication of a zero-
sum competition, notwithstanding 
widespread support for additional 
sources of investment, which is 
in turn conducive to generating 
growth in demand in the region’s 
economies.  
This vision deserves to be 
debunked.  Talk of US decline is a 
long-standing American neurosis. 
Similar sentiments of weakness 
emerged in the early 1970s, after 
the Arab oil embargo, and again in 
the 1980s after Japan’s phenomenal 
rise prompted fears of US economic 
eclipse.  In both periods, there was 
no shortage of foreign jingoism, 
in support of the argument that 
America’s global position had 
peaked.  In both cases the US proved 
far stronger than its internal or 
external critics imagined.  The re-
emergence of US-decline rhetoric 
today is in fact a sign of American 
strength, which starts with brutal 
self-reflection.
Arguably, America’s relative 
position is stronger now than in 
the 1970s or 1980s.  China has not 
caused the United States economic 
harm as the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) states did in the 1970s. 
Quite the reverse. China has 
proved a hugely beneficial economic 
partner for the US.  Nor has 
Chinese competition had anywhere 
near the impact that Japan’s did 
in the 1980s.  True, China seems 
destined soon to end America’s 
140-year run as the world’s biggest 
economy if one believes the latest 
purchasing-power estimates of the 
World Bank.  On the other hand, 
the crash of China’s stock markets 
in the summer of 2015 made it clear 
that the Chinese economy is not 
as stable as its nascent high-speed 
train system.  
In the future, China’s vision of 
seeing revitalization of economic 
growth in countries along the 
ancient Silk Road and in maritime 
trade routes from Southeast Asia to 
the Persian Gulf notwithstanding, 
its economic performance will 
just have to continue to reply on 
unfettered access to the financial 
systems and consumer markets of 
the United States and its security 
allies.  More fundamentally, the 
production chain weaving together 
the economies of China, Japan, the 
US and other Asia-Pacific countries 
is very strong and no economy can 
expect to flourish by diminishing its 
participation in it. 
To many of the region’s geostrategic 
thinkers schooled through the 
American intellectual tradition of 
International Politics theory, the 
crux of the issue is that China, 
unlike Japan in the 1980s, has failed 
to meet America’s expectations of 
evolving into a like-minded country. 
China’s record in poverty reduction, 
both at home and abroad through 
aid and investment, means little 
to those who see Western-style 
political democracy as an absolute 
value.  This judgment validates the 
fears of Chinese thinkers who see 
the US as fundamentally committed 
to the overthrow of China’s political 
order in order to remake its system 
in the American image.
Many Chinese observers are puzzled 
by America’s characterization of 
China as a military threat; by any 
objective measure, China is decades 
away from military parity with the 
US, and indeed may never attain it. 
Chinese analysts also see American 
rhetoric and action as a strong 
factor behind the heightening of 
maritime sovereignty differences in 
the East and South China Seas in 
recent years, after being dormant 
for many decades.  The US and 
its allies claim to see a China 
determined to seek revenge for the 
past and domination in the future. 
It is a matter of regret, and concern 
that voices of calm in the US simply 
fall on deaf ears.1 The result of these 
perceptions is a self-perpetuating 
belief in inescapable enmity.
Security anxieties in the Asia 
Pacific do have legitimate causes 
but further heightening is not 
immutable.  For China, there needs 
to be more appreciation of the 
positive role the US has played in 
enabling its prosperity.  China’s 
forty years of sustained economic 
growth coincides with the history 
of a workable relationship with the 
United States.  China’s confidence 
in its governing system is justifiable, 
but wholesale rejection of foreign 
(including American) lessons and 
ideas for economic and political 
governance can only be a net loss 
for China.  Furthermore, a United 
States that continues to be strong 
is in China’s economic self-interest.
For its part, the US must face the 
unpleasant truth that its capacity 
to re-shape another country’s 
system of governance is limited—
especially in regard to a large 
and complex society like China 
with deep-rooted and generally 
successful governance traditions. 
And American geostrategic thinkers 
should consider the positive value 
of political stability in China. 
Stability does not simply mean the 
unwelcome persistence of a regime 
they dislike: a stable and secure 
China is one that, in the long run, is 
more likely to accept the possibility 
of learning from the US. 
Between China and Japan, the 
history issue is often said, including 
by those in both countries tasked 
to find ways out of the continuing 
impasse, to be the key roadblock to 
getting back to a normal routine of 
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high level interactions.  Over time, 
hope for government-sponsored joint 
versions of the history of World War 
II has faded.  What can be done next?
China should come up with the 
intellectual fortitude to highlight 
domestically Japan’s post-war 
contributions towards China’s pursuit 
of modernization.  In the 1950s, 
while locked in Cold War hostility 
towards the Chinese government, 
the Japanese government allowed 
limited trade activities to proceed 
when the former was under broad 
Western isolation in the wake of the 
Korean War.  Official development 
assistance from Japan played a 
powerfully supportive role in China’s 
re-linking with the rest of the world 
economy, and not only in a material 
sense. Particularly in the 1970s and 
1980s, the fact that China and Japan 
were able to sustain cooperative 
trade and investment relations was 
seen as a vote of confidence in China 
by other industrialized nations. 
China could not have succeeded 
in improving its relative economic 
position, were it not for the foundation 
laid in these early years.  China 
has, of course, repaid its Yen loans, 
but this history of economic aid still 
merits recognition. 
Likewise, Japan needs to 
demonstrate political courage and 
argue that the time has come for 
its government to finally stay clear 
of efforts to whitewash what the 
country did in China and the Korean 
peninsula during the war.  Yes, the 
Japanese political system is far 
more pluralistic; Japanese political 
parties and individual politicians 
are elected to speak on behalf of 
their constituencies.  But how the 
Japanese polity projects the country’s 
past to its own citizenry has been, is 
and will be taken into account by 
other countries, especially those that 
once suffered. Japan should beware 
of the future costs that the ongoing 
diplomatic tensions carry.  A truly 
wise approach would be to re-orient 
domestic conversations about the 
past and their present-day relevance 
for the nation as a whole.
For other countries in East Asia, space 
must be made for a distinct narrative 
about their positions in the evolution 
of the region’s security dynamic: 
the supposed choice between China 
and the US as the ultimate security 
guarantor is a false one.  The past few 
years have witnessed Washington, 
Beijing, Tokyo testing their separate 
capacities in building up respective 
coalitions of the willing in the East 
Asian region and even beyond, over 
issues ranging from investment to 
maritime order.  Factors feeding into 
this rivalry include changes in United 
States policy as well as campaigns by 
some Southeast Asian governments, 
those of the Philippines and Vietnam 
in particular.  For China, the United 
States and Japan, it is becoming 
more obvious that no party can 
prevail in attempting to re-engineer 
the regional security and economic 
order as textbook geostrategic and 
geoeconomic mapping would suggest.
The time has come for security 
analysts to look back at advocacy 
and actions taken in the past five 
years—over maritime issues in 
East Asia, for example—and ask: 
is the region better off than before? 
If so, what risks can be accepted as 
sensible when continuing to push 
the boundaries of nerve testing?  If 
not, what can be done to persuade 
our domestic and international 
audiences to support efforts toward 
positive symmetry in handling the 
region’s security challenges, hard 
and soft?  Luckily, unlike the Middle 
East or Eastern Europe, East Asia 
enjoys a rather solid societal basis 
for dispute resolution. This is largely 
as result to the regions high level of 
economic integration, and effective 
multilateral channels such as the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, 
and informal security dialogue 
proposed by ASEAN.  By putting the 
principle of inclusivity into practice 
wherever manageable, parties stand 
a better chance of extending the 
aggregate stability of the region and 
locating each spur of anxiety in its 
proper, relative place. 
Zha Daojiong
Professor of International Political 
Economy, Peking University. 
1 Chas Freeman, Jr. Diplomacy on the 
Rocks: China and Other Claimants in the 
South China Sea, at http://chasfreeman.
net/diplomacy-on-the-rocks-china-and-
other-claimants-in-the-south-china-sea/. 
The Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Ronald Regan (CVN 76) off the island of Iwo To, 
Japan, 29 September 2015. Source: US Navy.
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Carter and Kishida: US Defense Secretary Ash Carter shakes hands with Japanese Foreign 
Minister Fumio Kishida after signing an agreement during a ceremony at the Pentagon, 
Sept. 28, 2015. Source: US Department of Defense.
In Search of a Seamless Security Posture:  
US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines and 
National Security Legislation
Ken Jimbo
Abe’s Evolutionary Security 
Policy Reform
Highly controversial National 
Security Legislation was finally 
passed in the upper house of 
Japanese Diet on19 September 2015. 
The prolonged demonstrations and 
rallies near the Diet reflected the 
deep divisions within the Japanese 
public on how to reconcile a desirable 
security role with its pacifist 
Constitution.  
Although Abe’s security policy 
reform has been characterized as 
a watershed pushing the country 
towards a more aggressive military 
posture, this development in 
reality is ‘evolutionary’ rather than 
revolutionary.1  Japan’s priority 
still resides in the defence of its 
own territory and ensuring the US 
forward presence through US-Japan 
security alliance.  Although the 
security legislation allows Japan to 
exercise the long-banned right of 
collective self-defense, its operational 
scope is strictly confined to the case 
when Japanese national security is 
vitally challenged.
That said, the series of security reforms 
under the Abe administrations 
constitute a significant and dynamic 
package.  The major policy advances 
in the security field over the three 
years of the Abe Administration 
include the following:
w	Establishment of the National 
Security Council and National 
Security Bureau (December 2013);
w	National Security Strategy 
(December 2013);
w	The Three Principles on Transfer 
of Defense Equipment and 
Technology (April 2014);
w	Cabinet Decision on Development 
of Seamless Security Legislation 
to Ensure Japan’s Survival and 
Protect its People (July 2014);
w	The Guidelines for Japan-US 
Defense Cooperation (April 2015);
w	Japan’s Legislation for Peace and 
Security (September 2015).
This package of reforms addresses a 
number of layers and dimensions of 
the national security arena, ranging 
from decision making processes 
and institutional reform, arms 
export policy, territorial defense, 
alliance management and Japan’s 
global engagement.  Indeed, the 
new security legislation consists 
of eleven different legal cases 
packaged together in an attempt to 
modify and streamline the patch-
work of legal arguments supporting 
security policy amendments that 
had accumulated since the end of 
the Cold War.  
Four dimension of ‘Seamless 
Security Posture’ for Japan
The key concept informing Japan’s 
current security policy reform 
has been the “seamless security 
posture”.2 The concept initially 
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emerged in the National Defense 
Program Guideline (NDPG) in 2004. 
That document underscored the 
importance of ensuring an effective 
response towards “new security 
threats and various situations” 
(obviously encompassing the rise 
of terrorism and asymmetrical 
threats), and urged a seamless, 
whole of government approach. 
Developments in defense doctrine 
from 2010 elaborated on the concept 
of seamlessness.  For example, the 
adoption of the “Dynamic Defense” 
concept in the NDPG 2010 aimed 
at enhancing the mobility and 
operational tempo of Japan’s 
Intelligence, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance (ISR) activities 
in the Southeastern Island Chain 
in order to deal with potential 
challenges seamlessly.  The concept 
also permeates a number of major 
documents, including the NDPG 
2013, the US-Japan Defense 
Cooperation Guidelines and 
National Security Legislation.
In order to decipher the concept, it 
is helpful to examine it from four 
distinct vantage points. 
a) Phases of Conflict
The US-Japan Defense Cooperation 
Guidelines (2015) underscored 
that “the two governments will 
take measures to ensure Japan’s 
peace and security in all phases, 
seamlessly, from peacetime to 
contingencies, including situations 
when an armed attack against 
Japan is not involved”.  The new 
Guideline encompasses the all-
phase/full-spectrum approaches to 
conflict escalation management, 
departing from the sharper divisions 
between peacetime, emergency and 
situation surrounding Japan in the 
previous Guideline in 1997.  
What should be underscored is the 
emergence of two new domains in 
Japan’s security threat perception. 
One is the so-called Gray-Zone 
challenges: infringements of 
Japanese territory that do not 
amount to a full-scale armed attack. 
As China has stepped up its assertive 
behavior in the East and South China 
Seas, it has become increasingly 
apparent that the territorial status 
quo can be challenged without 
crossing the military threshold. 
The Gray-Zone domain obviously 
requires the primary role to be 
played by law-enforcement agencies 
such as Coast Guards and what 
is required is deeper cooperation 
between the Coast Guards and 
Self-Defense Force, particularly 
for escalation management.  From 
the alliance perspective, enhancing 
US-Japan peace-time security 
cooperation including intelligence 
sharing through alliance 
coordination mechanisms and joint 
ISR operations will also contribute 
significantly towards managing 
Gray-Zone challenges.
Another domain is the heightening 
and expanding of Anti-Access and 
Area-Denial (A2/AD) challenges. 
The modernization of China’s 
conventional military capabilities is 
increasingly placing the US forward 
presence and its operations at 
risk.  As outlined in the Guidelines, 
protecting military facilities, air 
and missile defenses, as well as 
resiliency, hardening and damage 
repair capabilities are key to 
countering the A2/AD environment. 
The new Guidelines also suggested 
wider dispersal options in both 
commercial and non-commercial 
Japanese airports and ports to 
ensure flexible operations for US 
forces stationed in Japan.
b) Geography
The geographical scope of Japan’s 
security policy has expanded 
steadily over past decades. 
Since the establishment of the 
International Peace Cooperation 
Law enacted in 1992, Japan has 
dispatched personnel to 13 United 
Nations Peace Keeping Operations 
(PKO) worldwide.  The US-Japan 
Defense Cooperation Guidelines in 
1997 highlighted Japan’s expanded 
rear-area support in the Situation 
Surrounding Japan (mainly focusing 
on contingencies on the Korean 
Peninsula).  The Joint Statement of 
the US-Japan Security Consultative 
Committee in February 2005 
endorsed “Global common strategic 
objectives” as a commitment 
to promote peace, stability and 
prosperity around the world. 
The legal foundations for engaging 
different geographical layers—
territorial defense, regional, and 
global security—were individually 
established, however, and had little 
connectivity among them.  For 
example, when Japan dispatched 
its Self-Defense Force for the 
refueling mission in Indian Ocean 
in support of Operation Enduring 
Freedom from 2001 to 2007, 
and for the humanitarian and 
reconstruction mission in Iraq from 
2003 to 2009, these SDF operations 
were based on the Special Measures 
Bill with sunset clauses.  A 
political awareness developed that 
without seamless geographical 
coverage ensured by a permanent 
law, Japan’s regional and global 
engagement would be jeopardized.
Under the two laws related to 
support activities by the SDF 
(namely, the Law to Ensure 
Security for Situations that will 
have an Important Influence on 
Japan’s Peace and Security; and 
the International Peace Support 
Law), the SDF will be able to 
provide necessary logistics support 
and search and rescue assistance 
to armed forces of foreign 
countries collectively addressing 
the situations outlined in these 
laws. Under the new legislation, 
geographical constraints on 
engaging in alliance support and 
support for coalition missions will 
be significantly waived.
c) Cooperation with Others
Japan’s traditional security partner 
is the United States, its only treaty 
ally for more than six decades. 
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In the past, the laws explicitly 
affirmed SDF’s logistic support to 
US forces in accordance with the 
US-Japan Security Treaty.  For 
example, the Act Concerning the 
Measures for Peace and Safety 
of Japan in Situations in Areas 
Surrounding Japan enacted in 1999 
provided the SDF legal backing 
to implement the 1997 US-Japan 
Defense Cooperation Guideline to 
provide rear-area support only to 
the United States.
The 2015 US-Japan Defense 
Cooperation Guidelines and the 
National Security Legislation both 
enable the provision of necessary 
support activities to the US and other 
countries’ armed forces in situations 
that will have an important influence 
on Japan’s peace and security. 
The amended Self-Defense Force 
law also enables the protection of 
weapons/other equipment of the US 
and other countries’ armed forces. 
Additionally, the International Peace 
Support Law enables the provision 
of necessary support activities to 
the armed forces of foreign countries 
collectively addressing the situation, 
which threatens the international 
peace and security.
With a scope of operations that now 
covers cooperation with countries 
other than the United States, 
Japan’s security engagement in 
peacetime and during any crisis 
will be further enhanced.  The 
new legal arrangement will enable 
the SDF to conduct more robust 
joint training and exercises with 
regional partners such as Australia, 
India and ASEAN.  There will 
be fewer legal qualms over joint 
operations for common purposes 
such as humanitarian support 
and maritime patrol.  During any 
crisis, the new legislation also 
allows the provision of support to 
other regional partners engaged 
in the contingency.  For example, 
a crisis on the Korean peninsula 
could see the deployment of   US-
led multinational force.   Japan 
can now function as a key logistics 
hub during such a crisis, offering 
support to the forces of all the 
nations engaged in the operation.  
d) Cross-Domain Response
The new security reforms in Japan 
would also support high-end 
scenarios to support Pentagon’s 
Joint Operation Access Concept 
(JOAC).  This concept, announced 
in January 2012, seeks to ensure 
that US joint forces would achieve 
operational access - the ability 
to project military force into an 
operational area—in an A2/AD 
environment.  Its central theme, 
rather highly conceptual, is 
attaining Cross-Domain Synergy, 
described as  “the complementary 
vice merely additive employment 
of capabilities in different domains 
such that each enhances the 
effectiveness and compensates for 
the vulnerabilities of the others 
to establish superiority in some 
combination of domains that will 
provide the freedom of action 
required by the mission”.
Under the new Guidelines and 
National Security Legislation, 
the US and Japan will work to 
ensure the resiliency of relevant 
space assets and their networks 
and systems.  Japan has tasked 
the Japan Aerospace Exploration 
Agency (JAXA) to provide space 
situation awareness information to 
the United States, demonstrating 
a commitment to deeper inter-
agency collaboration to support 
the national security agenda. 
Cooperation in cyberspace includes 
improvement of individual cyber 
capabilities and interoperability 
between the Self-Defense Forces 
and US Forces.  Cooperation will 
encompass sharing information in 
peacetime to contingencies in which 
cyber threats challenge the mission 
assurance of both forces.
The Abe administration has 
achieved a historic reform of 
Japan’s security policy that has 
laid the legal foundation for the 
SDF to play a more active role in 
multiple domains.  The key concept 
of these series of reforms has been 
to develop a “seamless” security 
posture that streamlines operations 
in four major domains: 1) all-
phases of conflict, 2) geographically 
cross-boundary, 3) multinational 
cooperation, 4) cross-domain 
synergy.  These developments 
constitute a significant departure 
from the legal restrictions of the 
past in the defense and security 
field. Significantly, however, 
these reforms have been put in 
place without altering the major 
constraints enshrined in the 
Japanese Constitution. 
Despite these significant 
accomplishments on the political 
and legal fronts, a seamless 
security posture is still a long way 
off.  First, Japan needs to develop 
more sophisticated scenarios and 
concepts for managing Gray-Zone 
challenges.  As mentioned earlier, 
the primary agency to deal with 
non-military challenges at sea 
will be the Japanese Coast Guard. 
Japan has already indicated that it 
will fund the faster development of 
Coast Guard capabilities in coming 
fiscal years.  However, the Japanese 
Coast Guard Law has not been 
changed under the new security 
legislation.  Their criteria for the 
use of weapons are strictly limited 
and on a par with guidelines for 
the Police, namely, confined to self-
defense and emergency evacuation. 
What the new SDF law does allow 
is for the maritime SDF to step into 
the policing function swiftly if the 
government determines that this is 
necessary to deal with a Gray-Zone 
challenge.  The early involvement 
of the MSDF could put the prudent 
management of escalation at risk.
Second, the scope for exercising 
collective-self defense seems to 
be too narrow as a result of also 
adopting the Three New Conditions 
for Use of Force.  In the New 
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Security Legislation, collective-
self defense will be exercised 
only when the armed attack by 
a foreign country “threatens 
Japan’s survival and poses a clear 
danger to fundamentally overturn 
people’s right to life, liberty and 
pursuit of happiness”.  Although a 
historic step forward for Japan, it 
still sharply limits the exercise of 
collective-self defense, essentially 
to crises in the areas immediately 
surrounding Japan.  Any wider 
scope of operations, such as the 
defence of the US homeland or 
Pacific islands by Japan’s missile 
defenses would still not be ensured 
under the new legislation.
Abe’s evolutionary security reform 
has certainly provided a solid legal 
foundation for Japan’s proactive 
security policy in territorial defense, 
robust alliance management, and 
global engagement.  However, 
Japan must also be prepared to 
constantly update its security 
posture and legal framework in 
order to respond to the dynamics of 
the security environment in Asia.
Ken Jimbo
Associate Professor, Keio University
1 William Choong, “Abe’s security bills 
represent evolution not revolution”, 
IISS Voices (October 1, 2015); and 
Adam P. Liff, “Japan’s Defense 
Policy: Abe the Evolutionary”, 
Washington Quarterly (Summer 
2015).
2 Ken Jimbo, “In Search for Seamless 
Security Posture under the Abe Ad-
ministration: National Defense Pro-
gram Guideline, US-Japan Defense 
Cooperation Guideline, and Secu-
rity Legislation” Issue and Studies, 
vol.44, no.2, (June 2015).
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US President Obama with India’s Prime Minister Modi, January 2015. Source: The White 
House.
The Asia–Pacific Paradox:  
Rising Wealth, Rising Tension
Brahma Chellaney
The Asia-Pacific region is likely to 
remain for the foreseeable future 
the world’s economic-growth 
and maritime centre.  Yet the 
challenges in this region have been 
fundamentally changed by new 
geopolitical realities and the rise 
of unconventional threats.  It is 
important to view these challenges 
in the broader context of global 
power dynamics, including the 
ongoing power shifts.  Given the 
tectonic power shifts that are 
underway, the international order 
is clearly in transition. 
We live in a rapidly changing world. 
The pace of technological change 
has been revolutionary since the 
1980s, facilitating the ascent of 
Asian economies in particular.  The 
growing tide of new innovations has 
also contributed to the accelerated 
weaponization of science, even as 
the pace of innovation has shrunk 
the shelf-life of most technologies. 
Today, technological forces are 
playing a greater role in shaping 
geopolitics than at any other time 
in history.
Economically, the fast pace of change 
in technology, transportation costs 
and the regulatory environment 
has acted as a spur to the dramatic 
rise of Asia.  The share of world 
trade of the advanced economies in 
the past quarter-century has sunk 
from 75 percent to just below 50 
percent.  Developing economies are 
also attracting increasing amounts 
of foreign direct investments, with 
such inflows jumping from 20 percent 
to 50 percent of global totals just 
between 2002 and 2012. The global 
shifts in relative economic weight 
already experienced will be further 
accentuated in the period ahead. 
The pace of geopolitical change 
has been no less extraordinary. 
The geopolitical landscape in the 
Asia-Pacific has been significantly 
transformed since 1990.  The 
region is characterized by the 
accumulation of  greater relative 
power but also by new uncertainties. 
But as history testifies, major 
power shifts are rarely quiet.  Such 
shifts usually create volatility and 
uncertainty.  In fact, given the 
fast pace of political, economic and 
technological transformation that 
has been witnessed, one can assume 
that the next 25 years will bring 
about equally dramatic geopolitical 
change in the region. This means 
that the region, in the coming years, 
will be unlikely to enjoy a stable 
power equilibrium.
More broadly, the Asia-Pacific 
exemplifies that the world is 
becoming more interdependent—
and not just in trade and capital 
flows—rather the interdependencies 
extend to the technological, 
public-health, environmental and 
climate spheres.  For example, 
environmental degradation on the 
Tibetan Plateau, because of its 
towering height, is likely to affect 
general atmospheric circulation 
even in Europe and North America. 
China’s role as the largest 
greenhouse-gas emitter carries 
global implications.  The mobility 
of technical expertise in the Asia-
Pacific, as in Europe, is another 
example. Global pandemics serve 
as yet another example. 
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The Asia-Pacific also illustrates 
that the interdependencies are not 
bringing the world closer together. 
Rather they have intensified 
competition between important 
powers for relative advantage. 
In this context, the struggle for 
natural resources has set off 
sharpening geopolitical rivalries in 
the Asia-Pacific.  The resurgence of 
territorial and maritime disputes in 
the South and East China Seas, for 
example, is linked to the resource 
competition, given the significant 
possibility that the seas that 
surround the disputed islands  hold 
rich hydrocarbon reserves beneath 
the seabed. 
That economics cannot be 
separated from politics is apparent 
from the fact that booming trade 
between important countries has 
only accelerated their political 
rivalries.  In Asia, the danger of 
military conflict is most apparent 
between countries that boast 
booming bilateral trade.  Indeed, as 
underscored by the grating hydro-
politics in some river basins and 
the recrudescence of Cold War-era 
territorial disputes in Asia, trade 
and economic interdependence 
are no guarantee of moderation or 
restraint between states. 
Economic interdependence helps 
to raise the costs of political 
miscalculation, yet economics 
alone cannot solve politics or 
avert conflict. Economic forces, 
for example, have failed to rein 
in geopolitical competition over 
natural resources or to open 
up autocratic political systems 
thriving on market capitalism. 
Despite a greater role for economic 
power in international relations, 
politics continues to drive 
economics, with political risk 
dominating the financial markets 
and sanctions remaining as a 
viable policy tool. 
The Asia-Pacific shows that if 
estranged neighbors do not fix 
their political relations, fast-
rising bilateral trade will not be 
sufficient by itself to stabilize 
their relationship.  Not only does 
the region’s political integration 
lag badly behind its economic 
integration, it has no security 
framework of any kind, with even 
regional consultation mechanisms 
remaining weak.
One concern about the regional 
situation arises from the legacy 
of wars. Unlike Europe’s bloody 
wars of the first half of the 
twentieth century, which provoked 
changes that have made war there 
unthinkable today, the wars in Asia 
in the second half of the twentieth 
century only accentuated bitter 
rivalries. Several inter-country 
wars have been fought in Asia 
since 1950, when both the Korean 
War and the annexation of Tibet 
started, without resolving the 
underlying disputes.
In fact, history continues to hold 
the region hostage. As the recent 
70th anniversary of the end of 
World War II underscored, some 
nations in the region are still 
resurrecting the ghosts of history. 
How diplomatic relationships are 
held hostage to history is best 
exemplified by the strained ties 
between America’s closest allies 
in East Asia—South Korea and 
Japan.  These two countries face a 
stark choice: find ways to stem the 
recrudescence of bitter disputes 
over history or stay frozen in a 
political relationship that plays 
into China’s hands.
Playing the history card, China 
has made ultra-nationalism the 
legitimating credo of Communist 
rule.  In recent years, China 
has sought to draw attention to 
the atrocities committed by the 
Japanese during World War II by 
expanding and renovating war 
museums memorializing the 1931-
1945 invasion, as well as through 
other government projects and 
subsidies.  As though to stir its 
people into a frenzy of patriotism, 
China has also declared two 
new national days to remember 
Japanese aggression.
But what if the victims of China’s 
aggression followed its example and 
commemorated Chinese attacks 
on them?  China, while seeking to 
obscure its own aggressions and 
occupations since the communist 
‘revolution’—including the 1951 
annexation of the sprawling 
Tibetan plateau and invasions 
of India and Vietnam in 1962 
and 1979, respectively—has long 
called on Japan to take history as 
a mirror and demonstrate greater 
remorse for its past aggressions.
More ominously, history continues 
to shape national narratives and 
fuel competing nationalisms in 
the Asia-Pacific.  Squabbles over 
history and remembrance remain 
the principal obstacle to political 
reconciliation, reinforcing negative 
stereotypes of rival nations and 
helping to rationalize claims to 
territories long held by other 
nations.  In this economically 
integrating but politically 
divided region, relations between 
nations remain trapped in a 
mutually reinforcing loop: poor 
political relations help magnify 
and accentuate the history 
problem, thus chaining interstate 
relationships to history. 
Breaking out of such a vicious cycle 
demands forward-looking leadership 
and a will to political reconciliation. 
At present, though, the trend is in 
the opposite direction.  For example, 
attempts in East Asia to rewrite 
or sugarcoat history, including 
by revising textbooks or erecting 
memorials for newfound heroes, 
are inciting greater intra-regional 
rancor and recrimination.  A potent 
mix of domestic politics, increasing 
geopolitical competition, and military 
tensions has turned history into a 
driver of corrosive nationalism.
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Disputes between South Korea 
and Japan, and China and Japan 
over territories, war memorials, 
textbooks and natural resources 
are the result of an entangled 
history.  The Sino-Indian 
relationship is also a prisoner of 
the past, especially seen in the 
context of China’s elimination of 
the historical buffer— Tibet—and 
its subsequent war with India. 
Even the Chinese-South Korean 
relationship carries the baggage 
of history, burdened most recently 
by China’s revisionist claim to the 
kingdom of Koguryo, one of three 
kingdoms in ancient Korea.
The commitment of US President 
Barack Obama and Indian Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi to 
work with likeminded states to 
establish power equilibrium and 
a rules-based order in the Asia-
Pacific can make little headway 
if history remains a barrier to 
improved relations even between 
democracies.  Take Japan and 
South Korea: as export-oriented 
powerhouses with traditionally 
close cultural ties, the two share 
many values.  But resurgent 
history issues between them have 
put paid to hopes for a concert of 
democracies to rein in China’s 
growing assertiveness.
The century-old case of the Korean 
activist Ahn Jung-geun serves 
as a good example of history’s 
divisive hold.  Considered a 
terrorist in Japan where he 
was hanged but a hero in South 
Korea, Ahn assassinated four-
time Japanese prime minister 
and the first Resident-General of 
Korea, Hirobumi Ito, in 1909 at 
the Harbin city railway station in 
China.  The case has resurfaced 
after China opened a memorial hall 
in Harbin recently commemorating 
Ahn, prompting Japan to denounce 
China for glorifying a terrorist. 
The shrine was built at the request 
of South Korean President Park 
Geun-hye during a meeting with 
the Chinese President Xi Jinping 
in the summer of 2014.
South Korea, a hyper-nationalistic 
state like China, has sought to 
eliminate all signs of Japanese 
colonial rule.  But not all Asian 
states seek to obliterate their 
colonial past.  India continues 
to transact much of its key 
government business from British-
era edifices, and some of its major 
criminal and civil laws date from 
the colonial period. Taiwan—a 
former Japanese colony—also has 
a tolerant view of its imperial 
subjugation.
Some regional states, however, 
blend historical fact with myth. 
For example, China, as the fairy-
tale Middle Kingdom, claims to 
be the mother of all civilizations, 
weaving legend with history to 
foster a chauvinistic Han culture 
centered on regaining lost glory. 
The Communist Party projects 
great-power status as China’s 
historical entitlement. Indeed, 
by embellishing China’s past, it 
wants to make real the legend 
that drives Chinese revisionist 
history—China’s centrality in the 
world. This is reflected in Xi’s goal 
to build what he calls the “Chinese 
dream.” 
Harmful historical legacies create 
serious impediments to rational 
policy choices.  President Park, for 
example, has sought closer ties with 
China when South Korea’s natural 
regional partner is Japan.  Asia’s 
oldest liberal democracy, Japan 
has not fired a single shot against 
an outside party since World War 
II. President Park—the daughter 
of the military general who served 
as South Korea’s dictator for 18 
years until 1979—has yet to hold 
a single one-on-one meeting with 
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo 
Abe. 
 Asian states cannot change their 
past but they can strive to shape a 
more cooperative future.  If South 
Korea and Japan, for example, 
take the lead to put their past 
behind them, they could set an 
example for other interstate 
relationships in Asia that are 
burdened by historical differences 
and distortions.
More fundamentally, the Asia-
Pacific today is at a defining 
moment in its history.  The 
international spotlight on its rapid 
economic ascent has obscured the 
serious challenges it confronts.  The 
resurgent territorial, maritime, 
and history disputes highlight 
that securing regional peace and 
stability hinges fundamentally on 
respect for existing borders.  The 
single biggest source of regional 
instability today is a refusal to 
accept the existing territorial and 
maritime status quo.  This has 
prompted efforts to change the 
territorial and maritime borders 
through stealthy land grabs or 
land reclamation, especially in the 
South and East China Seas and 
the Himalayas.  
Regional states need to start 
discussing the security challenges 
in the Asia-Pacific.  Focused 
discussions are necessary to 
create institutions and rules-based 
cooperation and competition. 
There is no alternative to 
institutionalized cooperation. 
The region’s resource-related 
competition can be prevented from 
injecting greater instability and 
insecurity only by establishing 
rules-based cooperation and 
competition.  Unfortunately, 
there has been little headway in 
this direction thus far.  Regional 
economies need an integrated, 
holistic approach to resource-
security issues.  Environmental 
degradation in the region can 
potentially affect climatic, weather, 
and rainfall patterns in other parts 
of the world.  The Tibetan Plateau 
is warming at a rate almost twice 
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India’s Prime Minister Modi arrives at John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York, 23 
September, 2015. Source: http://pmindia.gov.in/en/image-gallery/.
as fast as the rest of the world, 
according to several scientific 
studies.  The Asia-Pacific must find 
ways to build a more sustainable 
and peaceful future for itself.
Brahma Chellaney 
Professor of Strategic Studies, 
Centre for Policy Research, 
New Delhi and a Richard von 
Weizsäcker Fellow at the Robert 
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Caption: A Russian Tu-95 Bear 'H'. Source: Wikipedia. 
Russia in the Indo-Pacific:  
A New Awakening?
Alexey D Muraviev
September 2015 may be 
remembered as a strategic turning 
point in Russia’s global fortunes. 
After more than a year of harsh 
criticism, targeted economic 
sanctions, and attempts to isolate 
Russia, the Kremlin is on the 
winning tide.  Russia’s President 
Vladimir Putin commanded the 
floor in New York when he took 
part in the Jubilee Assembly of the 
United Nations.  He succeeded in 
maneuvering Moscow’s strategy in 
Syria through intense discussions 
in New York, whereupon Russia 
was able to demonstrate to the west 
and the rest of the world its restored 
ability to undertake swift actions 
in support of its national strategic 
agenda.  The rapid massing of 
offensive air power reinforced by 
ground force elements and a naval 
task force not only placed Russia at 
the centre of the controversy over 
Syria and the fight against ISIL/ISIS 
but symbolized Moscow’s growing 
global ambitions in the contest for 
a role in global leadership, as well 
as the effective failure of the West 
to contain and drain Russia for its 
actions in Ukraine. 
The confrontation over Syria and 
the regime of Bashar al Assad, 
together with the crisis over 
Ukraine triggered by the ousting of 
then President Viktor Yanukovich 
and Russia’s takeover of Crimea 
have strained Moscow’s ties with 
many Western nations.  Russia’s 
actions in Ukraine in 2014 and 
2015 alarmed many European 
nations. Some nations felt more 
vulnerable, and others began to 
reconsider Russia as a reliable 
and predictable strategic partner. 
These developments effectively 
reanimated the confrontational 
tendencies that clouded the 
European and Transatlantic 
geopolitical space during the Cold 
War era. 
In Asia and the Pacific, the reaction 
to Russia’s rapid assertiveness 
within former Soviet Eurasia and 
in Europe was mixed.  Whilst 
Australia and Japan supported 
targeted economic and political 
sanctions, other regional powers 
either exercised a degree of 
restraint in condemning the Putin 
government, or displayed  respect 
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and recognition for Russia as a 
global player and a rediscovered 
regional partner.
Since Putin assumed the Russian 
presidency in 2000, the eastern 
vector of Russia’s strategic agenda 
has become more prominent.1  From 
2009, Moscow has accelerated its 
push for active reengagement with 
the region.  In 2010, Russia joined 
the East Asia Summit (EAS) at the 
same time as the United States.  In 
September 2012, it chaired the 24th 
Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) Summit in Vladivostok. 
Since Russia holds a perceived need 
to diversify its geo-economic agenda 
and the escalation of tensions with 
the West over Ukraine, Moscow has 
further deepened its long-standing 
impulse to re-engage with Asia and 
the Pacific, driven by economic, 
political and military–strategic 
considerations.
The military–strategic driver is a 
heightened threat perception on the 
eastern strategic flank compared 
to other geopolitical areas of 
significance for Russia.  However, the 
vast Asia–Pacific theatre provides 
Russia with both opportunities and 
challenges.  Moscow has leveraged 
itself by displaying its restored 
military power with potential allies 
and friends, including through 
military exercises and out-of-area 
deployments. Exercising overt 
deterrence in times of heightened 
geo-political tensions, such as those 
created by the crisis over Ukraine, 
have contributed to these threat 
perceptions.
When it comes to strategic and 
defence planning in the Asia-Pacific, 
planners in Moscow consider a 
number of ongoing and newly arisen 
factors that affect the geo-strategic 
landscape as they see it. These 
include a growing re-appreciation 
of the Indo-Pacific geopolitical 
system; Russia’s strategic interests 
in polar geopolitics—the Artic and 
the Antarctic vectors; heightened 
tensions with the US and some of 
its Asia-Pacific allies, including 
Australia; territorial disputes with 
the US and Japan; confrontation 
on the Korean Peninsula and the 
risk of conflict escalation; ongoing 
capability upgrades for  the Japan 
Self-Defense Forces and China’s 
People’s Liberation Army and Navy. 
As a result, Russian military 
activities in the area have 
intensified considerably. The extent 
of the Pacific Fleet’s operational 
naval activity in 2014 and 2015 
was impressive.  Russian warships 
operated throughout Southeast 
Asia, near the Western Pacific’s 
Horn of Africa. In late 2013, a task 
group from the Fleet was deployed 
to the Mediterranean to form the 
backbone of a reconstituted Russian 
Navy Mediterranean Squadron. 
Warships from the Baltic and Black 
Sea Fleets operating in the area 
called in on ports in Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore and Sri Lanka. 
In 2015, the Russian Navy staged 
joint Indra-2015 and SAREX-2015 
exercises with India and Japan 
respectively. These were followed 
by two large-scale maritime 
interoperability exercises with the 
Chinese Navy in May and August 
2015.
As part of its regional sub-
strategy aimed at improving the 
operational flexibility of its forces 
in forward areas, Russia’s Ministry 
of Defence has pursued targeted 
arrangements with several regional 
states (Seychelles, Singapore and 
Vietnam) to permit regular port 
calls by Russian warships.  Russia 
is not, at least for the time being, 
seeking a new network of overseas 
support bases but, rather, legal 
agreements which would allow the 
Russian Navy to rely on a number 
of foreign ports and bases for 
replenishment.
Since August 2007, the Russian 
armed forces have steadily 
increased another element of out-
of-area activity: long-range aircraft 
have resumed bomber patrols in 
key theatres of operations—the 
Atlantic, the Black Sea and the 
Pacific.  In the Pacific, Russia’s 
air force now operates bimonthly 
or monthly patrols, normally 
involving Tu-95MS bombers from 
the Ukraink air base.  Patrol areas 
include the Aleutian Islands, the 
Alaskan coastline and the vicinity 
of Japan.  Russian strategic aircraft 
have also made prolonged patrols 
near Taiwan and over Southeast 
Asia, and far out over the Pacific to 
the US island of Guam and the US 
West Coast.
Despite the increased operational 
tempo of the Russian Navy and 
Air Force, the current posture of 
the Russian armed forces east of 
the Urals is defensive in nature 
and lacks any substantial offensive 
capabilities.  The heightening of 
military-political tensions with 
NATO over Ukraine, as well as the 
continuing need to address security 
concerns in the Transcaucasia area 
and Central Asia has forced Moscow 
to allocate a major portion of its 
advanced military equipment and to 
concentrate the bulk of its offensive 
capabilities west of the Urals.  In 
the near-term, Russia’s defence 
efforts in Siberia and the Far East 
will be concentrated on upgrading 
its regional defensive posture, with 
an emphasis on key tactical and 
strategic deterrent capabilities. 
The Russian armed forces’ power 
projection capability in the Far 
East will be limited to the strategic 
bomber force, airborne troops and 
special operations elements, and 
the Navy.  Fortunately, the absence 
of the fear factor in the perceptions 
of the regional powers towards 
Russia gives Moscow a chance  to 
further its economic and political 
interests across Asia and the Indo-
Pacific.
That said, however, Russian 
Minister of Defence General 
Sergei Shoigu said in June 2014, 
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that the conventional capabilities 
of both the Pacific Fleet and the 
ground and air forces in the Eastern 
military district will be extensively 
modernized over the next five years. 
Similarly, on 30 September 2015, 
the new-generation Borey-class 
SSBN Aleksandr Nevskiy arrived at 
Rybachiy, marking the beginning of 
the organic replacement of the ageing 
Delta-class with next-generation 
sea-based strategic platforms.   
The economic driver of Russia’s 
regional re-engagement is the 
realization that the centre of 
global business activity is shifting 
towards the Asia-Pacific, and that 
its own economy, including the 
crucial energy and defence sectors, 
require market diversification and 
expansion.  A recent example of the 
implementation of such strategy 
was the signing in May 2014 of 
the 30-year mega contract on the 
annual supply of 38 billion cubic 
metres of gas from Eastern Siberia 
to China.
The political driver is the desire to 
enhance Russia’s regional influence 
by reanimating old Soviet ties and 
by establishing close links with 
former political rivals, notably 
China.  Relations with Europe, and 
the Commonwealth of Independent 
States remain the prime strategic 
focus, but the eastern vector of 
Russian foreign policy is gaining 
importance.
Despite the rhetoric from Moscow, 
shared by some western analysts, 
that  Russia’s attention is switching 
away from Europe towards Asia 
and the Pacific, Russia has not 
articulated a clear regional strategy. 
Unlike the Soviet period, Russia’s 
engagement in the Asia-Pacific is 
driven neither by an overarching 
national agenda nor by political-
military challenges that require an 
immediate strategic response.  An 
assessment of Russia’s diplomatic 
and other activity in the region 
supports the view that Moscow is 
accelerating its efforts to develop 
regional political and security 
frameworks that will suit its long-
term strategic agenda. Its approach 
is based on developing bilateral 
strategic partnerships, notably with 
China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and 
Vietnam. 
Since 2009, Russia has again 
clearly recognized that Hanoi will 
be its key partner in Southeast 
Asia. Russian energy companies 
are actively engaged with their 
Vietnamese counterparts on joint 
projects inland and in coastal areas. 
Russia has resumed the supply 
of advanced military hardware 
to the Hanoi, with an emphasis 
of upgrading Vietnam’s air and 
naval capabilities, predominantly 
for interdiction and area denial 
operations.  Russian defence 
contractors have been involved in 
building the submarine training 
centre for Vietnam’s Navy at Cam 
Ranh Bay.  The Russian armed 
forces have resumed regular port 
calls to Cam Ranh Bay for refueling 
operations.  
Russia also considers good relations 
with both Koreas and Japan, 
critical to its regional engagement. 
The geographical proximity of 
North Korea to Russia borders and 
the potential fragility of the ruling 
regime combined with concerns 
regarding North Kearea’s weapons 
of mass destruction programs 
drives Moscow’s close engagement 
with Pyongyang.  Collaboration 
in the high technological sphere, 
the need for strategic investments 
in the Russian economy and the 
ongoing interest in maintaining 
political and security dialogue 
attracts Russia to South Korea and 
Japan. 
Similarly, the development of 
friendly relations with China and 
India is an important purpose 
of Russia’s foreign and strategic 
policy in Asia.  Beijing is at the core 
of Russia’s views and approaches 
towards regional engagement.2 
Russia’s foreign and strategic 
policy makers clearly place the 
People’s Republic of China at the 
forefront of Russia’s policies in 
greater Asia, and continue to aspire 
to former foreign minister Evgeniy 
Primakov’s design for a ‘Grand 
Triangular’ framework, involving 
an entente between Russia, China 
and India.3
Larger political dividends, such 
as an enhanced geopolitical 
standing, might also accrue from 
the security framework emerging 
under the auspices of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO).4 
The SCO has increased its global 
geopolitical weight and extended 
its Indo-Pacific footprint with the 
inclusion of India and Pakistan as 
full members of the organization at 
its summit meeting in Ufa in July 
2015. The ongoing tussle between 
Russia and China for control of that 
body complicates any assessment 
of potential net strategic dividends 
for Moscow. It is therefore not 
surprising that Russia also feels 
the need to expand its engagement 
in international security dialogues, 
and broadening its security agenda 
beyond key partners, such as the 
SCO, to include groupings like 
the BRICS—Brazil, India, China 
and South Africa.  In fact, the 
new Russian Defence Doctrine 
2014 suggests that consultations 
with BRICS members are gaining 
importance in Russia’s global 
risk assessments and policy 
formulation.5
In the context of the geopolitics of 
Asia and the Indo-Pacific, Russia’s 
return as a Pacific player is unlikely 
to destabilize the regional balance. 
Russia remains an important 
contributor to the global war on 
terror and is becoming increasingly 
prominent as a provider of energy 
resources.  Its influence in a number 
of regional forums is likely to remain 
high.  In the long run, Russia 
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may become a key player in the 
region’s efforts to restore stability 
in Korea and—notwithstanding 
its currently intensifying security 
relationship with Beijing—possibly 
to contain China, which many in 
Russia consider as a future security 
challenge.
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A New Model of Major Country Relations: 
Avoiding the Inevitable
Fan Jishe
A New Model of Major Country 
Relationship has been the major 
catchphrase in China’s foreign 
policy, especially in its relationship 
with the US.  The concept itself 
is not very new in China’s foreign 
policy, but it has been advanced 
in a visible way ever since the 
Sunnylands Summit in June 
2013.  What has motivated China 
to advance this idea?  How is the 
concept defined? Is this proposal 
helpful in handling China’s disputes 
with other countries?
An effort to promote 
transparency with strategic 
intention
China’s economic development 
in past three decades has been 
accompanied by concerns about the 
‘China threat’. In late 1990s, China 
started to increase its investment 
in military modernization, the last 
of the four modernization objectives 
set in the 1980s under Deng 
Xiaoping.  Double digit increases 
in the military budget and the new 
capabilities showcased in military 
parades were widely cited to justify 
this perception of “China threat”. 
The underlying logic goes like this: 
first, history teaches that the rising 
power will challenge the status 
quo power—as happened before 
WWI and WWII in the so-called 
Thucydides’s Trap; second, China 
will transform its economic power 
into military might; and third, 
China is not a democratic country, 
which the so-called Democratic 
Peace Theory suggests will make 
war more likely. 
China has tried hard to dispel 
such concerns and misperceptions 
and provide reassurance that 
China will not take that path.  The 
‘reassurance message’ China wants 
to convey is directed both at the 
world in general, and toward the 
United States in particular. 
In the first decade of 2000s, the new 
concept of China’s peaceful rise was 
first articulated in 2003 at Boao 
Forum by Mr. Zheng Bijian, then 
vice president of the CPC Party 
School. It was also later used by 
President Hu Jintao and Premier 
Wen Jiabao.  Two years later, in 
December 2005, the State Council 
Information Office published a 
white paper entitled ‘China’s 
Peaceful Development Road’.  In this 
White Paper, China argued that its 
national conditions, historical and 
cultural traditions and the present 
world development trends made 
the road of peaceful development 
an inevitable choice.  The White 
Paper was meant to reassure other 
countries that China was taking a 
road of peaceful development and 
would continue to do so as it became 
stronger in the future.
China’s relations with the United 
States have been its top priority for 
many years.  China has managed to 
find the appropriate framework for 
this bilateral relationship.  In late 
1990s, after China and the United 
States exchanged state visits, both 
countries agreed to work toward 
developing a constructive strategic 
partnership which was later recast 
as seeking to build a constructive 
and cooperative relationship.  In 
the Bush era, the new shorthand 
for the Sino-US relationship 
became candid, constructive, and 
cooperative. 
In 2011, China began to talk 
about a New Model of Major 
Country Relationship, and has 
since attached much importance 
to this concept.  The context of this 
proposal is particularly important. 
In 2010, China surpassed Japan in 
GDP, terms and became the Asia’s 
second largest economy.  Core 
Interests became a controversial 
topic in the Sino-US relationship, 
and the United States announced 
its high profile Pivot to Asia policy. 
This only added to the tension and 
the disputes between China and its 
neighboring countries over historical 
issues and territory claims, which 
became more troublesome than 
in the past.  Thus, scholars and 
officials from both China and the 
USwere very much concerned about 
the implications of China’s rise for 
its relationship with the US. 
Starting from then Vice President 
Xi Jinping’s visit to the United 
States in February 2012, the theme 
of building a New Model of Major 
Country Relationship has been 
highlighted consistently.  In a 
speech delivered at a luncheon co-
hosted by the National Committee 
and the US-China Business Council, 
Xi laid out the key components 
for New Model of Major Country 
Relationship: increasing mutual 
understanding and strategic trust, 
respect core interests and major 
concerns; deepening mutually 
beneficial cooperation; enhancing 
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cooperation; and coordination 
in international affairs and on 
global issues.  Immediately after 
the Sunnylands Summit, the 
essential features of New Model of 
Major Country Relationship were 
further distilled as: no conflict or 
confrontation; mutual respect; and 
win-win cooperation. This was 
China’s latest attempt to build a 
stable and constructive relationship 
between China and the US, which 
would be resilient enough to 
withstand possible challenges in 
the future.
A defensive proposal
President Xi defined the key 
features of New Model of Major 
Country Relationship himself, and 
Foreign Minister Wang Yi further 
elaborated this concept in his 
speech delivered at the Brookings 
Institution on 20 September, 2013. 
Key points in this narrative 
include: for both China and the US 
the international environment has 
been fundamentally transformed 
over recent decades—the two 
countries share many interests and 
are increasingly interconnected. 
Neither China nor the US will 
benefit from confrontation, and war 
will get them nowhere.  Avoiding 
conflict or confrontation is not a 
choice but a necessity.  Mutual 
respect means that each country 
respects each other’s system, core 
interests and concerns, and the 
path chosen by their people. This 
enables both countries to live 
together in harmony. Win-win 
cooperation is to work together and 
contribute on issues ranging from 
counterterrorism, nonproliferation, 
climate change to peace in 
the Middle East and economic 
development in Africa. 
As to how to build the New Model 
of Major Country Relationship, 
Foreign Minister Wang Yi has 
advanced a number of ideas: 
enhancing strategic trust, 
promoting practical cooperation; 
enhance people to people and 
cultural exchange; strengthening 
cooperation on international 
and regional hotspots and global 
issues; and prioritizing cooperation 
on Asia-Pacific affairs
Clearly, the proposal of New Model 
of Major Country Relationship is a 
message of strategic reassurance. 
Foreign Minister Wang Yi clearly 
stated that China respects 
the traditional influence and 
immediate interests of the United 
States in the Asia-Pacific, and 
China has never thought about 
pushing the US out of the region. 
Nor has China ever had the 
strategic intention to challenge or 
even replace the United States for 
its position in the world. 
This proposal has also been reduced 
to specifics.  Foreign Minister 
Wang Yi listed the areas of possible 
further pragmatic cooperation, 
including cyber security; climate 
change; the Syria issue; the 
Palestine and Israel peace process, 
the North Korea nuclear issue, and 
the Afghanistan issue.  China is 
ready to work together with the 
United States to address these 
regional and global challenges. 
In essence, the proposal is defensive. 
China respects American interests 
and concerns across the world in 
general, and in the Asia-Pacific 
region in particular. Meanwhile, 
China hopes the United States will 
also respect China’s interests and 
concerns.  In his speech, Foreign 
Minister Wang Yi noted that the 
Taiwan issue and the “system and 
path chosen by their people” as two 
of China’s major concerns, among 
others. 
Overall, the proposal advocates 
avoiding the bad, promoting the 
good and accommodating each 
other.  It is the broad and principled 
framework for Sino-US relations 
that China has pursed for so long. 
An assessment of progress
The proposal of New Model of Major 
Country Relationship has been 
helpful in dislodging some barriers 
which prevent bilateral cooperation 
and opening up some new vantage 
points for official dialogue. 
Both countries have shown their 
joint leadership on global issues, 
especially climate change.  In 
the November 2014 ASEAN 
Summit, both Presidents made 
historic commitments to curb their 
greenhouse emissions over the next 
two decades.  The United States 
would cut its 2005 level of carbon 
emissions by 26 to 28 percent 
before 2025, and China would 
peak its carbon emissions by 2030 
and will also aim to get 20 percent 
of its energy from zero-carbon 
emission sources by the same 
year.  During President Xi’s state 
visit to Washington in September 
2015, the two Presidents reaffirmed 
their determination to move 
ahead decisively to implement 
domestic climate policies; to 
strengthen bilateral coordination 
and cooperation; and to promote 
sustainable development; and 
support a transition to green, 
low-carbon and climate-resilient 
economies. 
Both sides have tried to narrow 
their differences and boost 
cooperation on regional security 
challenges, such as the nuclear 
crises in Iran and North Korea.  As 
stated by President Obama in a 
press conference on 25 September, 
2015, China was critical to both 
the sanctions regime that brought 
Iran to the negotiating table and 
to the talks that produced the 
comprehensive deal to prevent Iran 
from obtaining a nuclear weapons. 
China broadened its cooperation 
with the United States in addressing 
the proliferation challenge from 
North Korea.  As well, both sides 
decided to maintain communication 
and cooperation with one another 
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on the Afghanistan issue, to 
support peaceful reconstruction and 
economic development, support the 
reconciliation process and promote 
trilateral dialogue between China, 
the United States and Afghanistan. 
Bilaterally, military-to-military 
relations between China and the 
United States have progressed 
significantly in the past three 
years.  These advances include: 
exchange visits of high ranking 
military officials has increased 
dramatically; joint military 
exercises—such as the joint counter 
piracy naval exercise in the Gulf 
of Aden and the joint search and 
rescue exercise in Hawaii. Further, 
China was invited to participate 
the Rim of the Pacific Exercise; 
two Memoranda of Understanding 
on Confidence Building Measures 
were signed by the US and China 
in November 2014.  Overall, the 
military relationship has been 
substantially delinked from the 
political relationship, making it 
less vulnerable to other bilateral 
disputes. 
There have also been other efforts 
to manage bilateral differences. 
Cyber security issues have been a 
major source of friction in bilateral 
relations in recent times.  China and 
the US set up the China-US Cyber 
Working Group in 2013 to address 
the thorny topic.  Though China 
suspended this Working Group 
when the US indicted five Chinese 
military officers were involved in an 
alleged cyber theft case.  Both sides 
managed to address the case in the 
recent summit.  The two leaders 
agreed that neither government 
would conduct or condone economic 
espionage in cyberspace.  They also 
agreed on a high-level joint dialogue 
mechanism on fighting cybercrime 
and related issues, together with 
a senior experts group for further 
discussion of cyber security.
Though advances have been made 
in forging a New Model of Major 
Country Relationship between 
China and the US, the US has 
been very hesitant or at least 
less enthusiastic in responding to 
China’s request for mutual respect. 
American reluctance is partially 
because the United States is not 
ready yet to accept China as an 
equal great power, and partially 
because the United States is 
concerned that China remains quite 
vague on its core interests. 
Working on a strategically 
stable relationship
There can be no doubt that the rise 
of China will see China and the US 
develop a competitive relationship 
in the Asia-Pacific.  This will 
see competition in the political, 
economic and even military arenas. 
A competitive relationship is 
not necessarily negative.  What 
is important is preventing a 
competitive relationship from 
developing into a confrontational 
one. 
A New Model of Major Country 
Relationship between China and 
the United States is a solution 
proposed by China.  Over the past 
several decades, China and the 
US have developed four pillars 
supporting a strategically stable 
relationship between two countries: 
mutual vulnerability to a nuclear 
strike; shared interests and common 
challenges; economic and political 
interdependence; and mutual 
reliance on a prosperous and stable 
international environment. 
How can these four pillars 
be consolidated to make the 
strategically stable relationship 
reliably durable?  Now it is the 
America’s turn to provide its 
solution.  The US needs to answer 
the following questions: How China 
is defined in American foreign, 
military, and security strategies? 
Is China entitled to protect its 
core interests?  How are China’s 
increased and increasing economic, 
political and military capabilities 
viewed?  Are these capabilities seen 
as enabling China to take more 
international responsibilities, to 
contribute more to the international 
public good, or viewed as preparing 
for the 'inevitable' conflict? 
Fan Jishe
Senior Fellow and Director for 
Strategic Studies, Institute of 
American Studies at Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences.
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The Ascent and Demise of “New Type of Great 
Power Relations” Between the US and China
Bonnie Glaser and Jake Douglas
In 2015, relations between the 
United States and the People’s 
Republic of China continued the 
steady decay seen in recent years. 
Their visions for the future order in 
Asia, and to some extent globally, 
now diverge sharply over issues 
of profound disagreement like 
maritime disputes, regional security 
architecture, cyber security, and 
international financial institutions. 
While Washington and Beijing 
did sign a significant military-to-
military agreement and agree to 
establish a new high-level dialogue 
mechanism on cybercrime during 
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state 
visit this September, there are few 
other tangible signs of progress 
in the security domain.  Many 
observers believe a rubicon has 
been reached, if not yet crossed, and 
that the two countries are in acute 
danger of slipping into outright 
strategic rivalry.
It is therefore especially timely to 
reflect on the idea that was supposed 
to prevent this. Xi’s signature foreign 
policy concept, the “New Type of 
Great Power Relations” (NTGPR, 
or xinxing daguo guanxi), for a time 
embodied the joint aspiration of 
these nations to avoid the historical 
trap of established and rising powers 
inevitably coming into conflict.1 Yet 
the mutual desire for peace quickly 
ran aground on the practical question 
of implementation: peace on whose 
terms? Policy disagreements have 
eroded trust between the two capitals 
and frustration within Washington 
has grown at the perception that 
Beijing has sought to use the NTGPR 
to obtain and legitimize unilateral 
concessions that advance Chinese 
interests at America’s expense.  As 
President Barack Obama prepares 
to enter his last year in office, the 
Administration appears all but 
ready to shed the phrase and much 
of the optimism that inspired it.  The 
implications reach far beyond words.
The idea for using a NTGPR 
framework to re-conceptualize 
Sino-American ties seems to have 
originated with former Chinese 
state councilor Dai Bingguo, who 
first used it in remarks at the second 
round of the US-China Strategic 
and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) 
in 2010.  Xi Jinping was then vice 
president, and Presidents Obama 
and Hu Jintao had only just agreed 
in 2009 on a new joint objective of 
“build[ing] a positive, cooperative, 
and comprehensive US-China 
relationship for the 21st century”. As 
the first years of his administration 
have shown, however, Xi like 
Deng Xiaoping before him is a “big 
ideas guy” determined to imprint 
his personal stamp upon Chinese 
politics.  Xi took Dai’s idea and ran 
with it.
Xi gave his first and fullest 
elaboration of the concept during a 
visit to the United States in February 
2012.  Shrewdly building it out of 
President Hu’s existing intellectual 
structure, in an address to 600 top 
US corporate and political leaders, 
Xi called for the two nations to begin 
working towards a “new type of 
relationship between major countries 
in the 21st century”. In another 
speech at the State Department, Xi 
hinted at the challenge prompting 
such effort: a transformative shift in 
power between the world’s “largest 
developing country” and “largest 
developed country”, between 
whom there are few cultural or 
ideological similarities.  To navigate 
it peacefully would be a unique 
diplomatic achievement, for which 
“there is no precedent for us to follow 
and no ready experience for us to 
refer”.
Independently, a parallel idea arose 
at the same time in the American 
halls of power.  Then-Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton gave an 
important speech in March outlining 
how the US hoped to manage China’s 
rise.  This task was herculean, 
because Washington sought “to 
work with a rising power to foster 
its rise… while also sustaining and 
securing American leadership”. 
Clinton’s framing was actually more 
complex than the “Thucydides Trap” 
with which it is often conflated. 
Not only does the US wish to avert 
a repeat of the tragedy of ancient 
Athens and Sparta during their 
hegemonic war, but it also seeks 
enhanced cooperation on a host of 
pressing regional and global issues 
that cannot be solved without 
China’s support. 
Beijing was probably the first to 
realize the basic compatibility 
between these two concepts.  By 
May of that year, China was gearing 
up for a once-in-a-decade leadership 
transition, and Xi’s strength was 
already great enough to influence 
the agenda of the 4th S&ED. 
President Hu appears to have been 
persuaded to present Xi’s new 
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idea.  The opening session was even 
named after the NTGPR concept. 
The Chinese had evidently listened 
closely to Secretary Clinton’s speech 
in March 2012, and parroted almost 
her exact language about “writ[ing] 
a new answer” to “age-old” problem 
of power transitions.  It proved an 
effective buy-in tactic—Clinton said 
she was honored so many Chinese 
officials had referenced “her” idea. 
American officials probably also 
appreciated that as a new leader, 
Xi wanted to break with former 
president Hu and pioneer his own 
concept for this critical bilateral 
relationship.  In theory, making 
such a grand rhetorical gesture 
could have gone a long way towards 
securing his goodwill.
The NTGPR received its most 
authoritative acclaim by the two 
heads of state in June 2013 at the 
Sunnylands Summit.  President 
Obama spoke of the need to “forge 
a new model of cooperation between 
countries based on mutual interest 
and mutual respect”.  In his own 
remarks, President Xi offered 
what became the most common 
Chinese definition of the concept: 
no confrontation or conflict, mutual 
respect and win-win cooperation. 
Xi also articulated a second, sub-
concept—“the new type of military-
to-military relations”—that was 
welcomed by then-Secretary of 
Defense Chuck Hagel and featured 
prominently in the Defense 
Department’s 2014 China Power 
Report, as well as in many of the 
secretary’s public addresses.2 
Through the medium of National 
Security Advisor Tom Donilon, the 
US broadcast that it had reached 
a “consensus” with China to work 
towards this new model. 
Yet from the very beginning, 
irreconcilable differences in 
interpretation signaled the practical 
limits of the NTGPR framework.  For 
instance, Obama Administration 
officials (except for the State 
Department) have carefully avoided 
using the ‘great power/major 
country’ modifier.  Beijing designed 
the NTGPR with only Washington 
in mind, so it is extremely rare 
for Chinese officials, scholars and 
media to include any other country 
under its umbrella.  This exclusivity 
intensified fears of abandonment 
or a Sino-American “G2” power-
sharing arrangement among US 
allies and partners.  Tokyo privately 
pressed hard for Washington to 
ditch the proposal, so much so that 
then-National Security Council 
senior director for Asian affairs 
Evan Medeiros sought to mollify 
Tokyo’s concerns in an interview 
with a Japanese newspaper.  
Although every S&ED Strategic 
Outcomes factsheet since 2013 
has reaffirmed the accord reached 
at Sunnylands to work towards 
“a new model of relations”, this 
watered-down phrasing reflects the 
Administration’s refusal to bend to 
Beijing’s loaded language. 
Perhaps most importantly, the 
United States and China have 
very different definitions of 
mutual respect.  In his readout of 
the Sunnylands Summit, State 
Councilor Yang Jiechi asserted 
that the two countries had agreed 
to acknowledge “each other’s core 
interests and major concerns”.  The 
issue is that Beijing really means 
US one-sided accommodation of 
what China believes to be its core 
interests—the set of policy areas on 
which it brooks no compromise and 
sees US intervention as illegitimate. 
Xi did not dive into the details 
publicly at Sunnylands, but he had 
already expounded upon this aspect 
at great length in his 2012 speech as 
vice president.  Then, Xi had named 
three core interests: Taiwan, Tibet, 
and China’s unique “development 
path” (code for the legitimacy of the 
Chinese Communist Party and its 
authoritarian model of governance). 
Neglecting to mention any US core 
interests, Xi obviously felt Beijing 
had shown Washington excessive 
deference and that it is past time to 
balance the scales.
With its longstanding human rights 
concerns and defense commitments 
under the Taiwan Relations Act, 
Washington probably would never 
have swallowed true accommodation 
on even this limited range of issues. 
China’s evolving definition of its core 
interests and the NTGPR framework 
in general has only exacerbated this 
problem.  In addition to the restive 
Xinjiang province, some Chinese 
officials controversially applied the 
core interest label to the South China 
Sea in 2010 and to the Senkaku/
Diaoyu islands in 2013.  The 2011 
White Paper on China’s Peaceful 
Development and the new national 
security law in 2015 also identified 
“sovereignty and territorial 
integrity” as core interests.  As for 
the new model, at the sixth S&ED 
in July 2014 President Xi explicitly 
connected it with this much broader 
reading of Chinese core interests. 
When a Chinese fighter jet engaged 
an American patrol aircraft in a dicey 
“Top Gun” encounter the following 
month, the Chinese foreign ministry 
spokeswoman linked the idea that 
realizing NTGPR must begin in 
Asia and lead to the reduction 
and eventual termination of US 
close-in surveillance along China’s 
periphery. 
The biggest question is what China 
thinks the concept means at the 
level of grand strategy. Beijing has 
been inconsistent about whether 
it welcomes a role for the United 
States in the Asia-Pacific.  Even 
as China assures the US that the 
Pacific Ocean is big enough for both 
powers, in May 2014 Xi Jinping 
outlined a new “Asia for Asians” 
security concept at the Chinese-
hosted meeting of the Conference on 
Interaction and Confidence Building 
in Asia.  This stokes fears that China 
is trying to supplant the United 
States as Asia’s leading power and is 
using the NTGPR to seek its ejection 
from the region.  Indeed, in May 2015 
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Chinese Ambassador to the United 
States Cui Tiankai implied that to 
overcome its “Cold War mentality” 
and build the new model, the United 
States would have to abandon its 
military alliances in Asia.
Accepting Beijing’s maximalist 
definition of the NTGPR 
would conflict with many of 
Washington’s most vital security 
interests in the Asia-Pacific.  In 
particular, defaulting on its treaty 
commitments would jeopardize 
the bilateral access and basing 
agreements that allow the US to 
surmount the “tyranny of distance” 
involved in projecting power 
halfway around the globe.  Over 
time, frustration in Washington 
has mounted with Chinese constant 
efforts to persuade the US to publicly 
reaffirm support for the NTGPR 
label. Following the Sunnylands 
Summit, US officials immediately 
began competing with China to 
define the framework on their own 
terms.  In March 2014, Medeiros 
argued that Washington and Beijing 
“need to focus less on core interests 
and… more on common interests”. 
At the 6th S&ED Secretary Kerry 
said that the NTGPR was “not 
going to be defined by us carving 
up areas and suggesting there are 
spheres of influence… [but] by 
our mutual embrace of standards 
of global behavior”.  National 
Security Advisor Susan Rice 
stressed in a speech that the US 
and China should “operationalize” 
the framework—and not just 
agree on a slogan—by specifying 
concrete avenues for increased 
cooperation.  At the fifth S&ED, 
Deputy Secretary of State William 
Burns linked Chinese fidelity to the 
spirit of the new model to Chinese 
progress in areas as diverse as the 
exercise of restraint; rules-based 
regional architecture; human 
rights; intellectual property theft; 
freedom of navigation; unimpeded 
commerce; the UN Law of the Sea; 
and even its handling of the Edward 
Snowden case. 
Ultimately, the NTGPR has fallen 
as quickly as it rose to prominence. 
The Obama Administration is weary 
of playing the slogan game, and its 
willingness to engage President Xi 
on the language of the new model 
has worn thin.  Beyond the well-
known policy disagreements, US 
patience has been stretched to the 
breaking point by Chinese state 
media repeatedly spinning America’s 
acceptance of the framework in ways 
it does not support.  Frustration 
builds every time Beijing says 
Washington has already agreed to 
what the United States sees as an 
aspiration that requires hard work 
on both sides to achieve.  The impact 
of lobbying by US allies and partners 
should also not be underestimated. 
US officials privately complain 
about the Chinese misrepresenting 
Washington’s position to ASEAN 
countries, suggesting the United 
States is privileging Chinese interests 
at their expense. 
Since September 2014, there has 
been significant rollback in US official 
discourse.  Rice conspicuously avoided 
mentioning the NTGPR during talks 
in Beijing that fall.  Even more 
pointedly, following the November 
APEC summit Obama outlined 
his own vision for the relationship 
as expanding cooperation and 
narrowing differences where possible. 
The Pentagon under Secretary 
Ashton Carter has also scrubbed any 
allusion to a new military-to-military 
model.  Despite repeated use by 
senior Chinese officials in speeches 
and op-eds published in American 
newspapers, the NTGPR was all but 
dropped from the June 2015 S&ED, 
and US officials did not make so 
much as one public reference to the 
new model during Xi’s official state 
visit in September 2015.  
The United States has evidently 
concluded that the costs of repeating 
the term outweigh the benefits.  To 
Beijing’s chagrin, the administration 
appears to have concluded that the 
NTGPR is an unnecessary liability.
Of course, we do not know what 
Obama has said in private, and 
the White House is not openly 
rejecting the concept either.  Yet as 
the United States’ competition with 
China for security and influence 
continues to deepen, Washington 
will probably stop talking about 
the new model of relations that was 
supposed to prevent it. Although US 
officials will continue highlighting 
the need for increasing cooperation, 
managing differences and even 
avoiding rivalry, they will do so in 
a significantly more pessimistic 
context.  
Both countries may have 
overreached in seeking to turn a 
mutual desire to avoid conflict into 
wide-ranging concessions by the 
other side. It is still conceivable 
that Beijing will decide to accept the 
legitimacy of a strong US presence 
in the Asia-Pacific, and Washington 
may ultimately accommodate a role 
for China commensurate with its 
power.  
But achieving a modus vivendi will 
require tough negotiations and 
genuine mutual respect.  Mouthing 
the words of the “new type of great 
power relations” will not be a 
panacea for all of the ills in China’s 
relationship with the United States.
Bonnie S. Glaser
Senior adviser for Asia and 
Director of the China Power Project 
at the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies. 
Jake A. Douglas 
Research assistant with the Japan 
Chair at Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies.
1 China’s preferred English-language trans-
lation is “new model of major country 
relationship”.”
2 On the rise and fall of the “new type of 
military-to-military relations” concept, 
see Bonnie Glaser and Jake Douglas, “An-
other Sign that US-China Relations Are 
Souring,” National Interest, July 7, 2015.
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China’s Concept for a New Type of Great Power 
Relations: An Indian Perspective
Neelam D. Sabharwal and Hemant K. Singh
On the agenda for the Xi-Obama 
summit during Chinese President Xi’s 
first state visit to the US from 23-28 
September 2015, Beijing’s insistence 
on engaging the US on a new type 
of major-power relations over the 
next decade featured prominently. 
Having emerged as an economic 
powerhouse following decades of 
spectacular and sustained growth, 
China now rivals the US as a major 
economic power.  Furthermore, as a 
development paradigm, the so-called 
“Beijing consensus” is superior to the 
“Washington consensus”, has gained 
traction in global discourse.  Backed 
by its rapidly modernizing military 
and growing political influence in 
regional and global institutions, an 
ascendant China sees itself as the 
rising power in a region where the 
long dominant power, the United 
States, is declining.  Clearly, China 
sees this as an opportune moment 
to reposition itself in relation to the 
world’s sole existing great power and 
claim its rightful place at the global 
high table.
At the same time, China recognizes 
that even as its power gap with the US 
shrinks, in GDP terms its economy is 
still little more than half that of the 
US. China also lags way behind in 
soft power appeal.  Though the largest 
fast-growing economy in the world, 
China is still by its own admission 
an emerging economy aspiring to 
moderate prosperity.  In other words, 
China is the first developing country 
to have achieved major power status.
Due to the asymmetry of resources 
vis-à-vis the US and questions about 
its own future economic growth, 
China worries about major challenges 
from the established great power, 
as evidenced by its concerns about 
America’s “Rebalance” towards 
Asia.  These concerns extend to the 
emergence of other rising powers, 
new strategic alignments and the 
consolidation of existing alliances in its 
neighborhood.  China has thus placed 
itself in opposition to the “Rebalance”, 
seeing it as a cover for countries led 
by the US ganging up on China to 
prevent its peaceful development. 
These factors, combined with 
China’s presumptive claim to major 
power status with its accompanying 
regional initiatives such as the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank and 
new China-led security constructs for 
Asia, have in turn directly challenged 
the US role in East Asia’s security 
order. 
Given China’s unilateral assertiveness, 
most regional countries want the US 
define its position on China with clarity. 
This also goes for China’s projection 
of its territorial and maritime claims, 
and other destabilizing actions from 
Northeast Asia to Southeast Asia.  The 
response of regional states to these 
actions will also determine acceptance 
of China’s claim to regional supremacy 
and positioning as a global power. 
There is also regional support for 
America’s constructive engagement in 
Asia for continued stability.  The last 
five years have seen the deepening 
of Trilateral strategic cooperation 
between Australia, Japan and the 
US, advances in the India-Japan-
US Trilateral and an increase in 
bilateral strategic partnerships such 
as the ones developed between India 
and Japan and India and Vietnam. 
ASEAN states have welcomed the US 
role at the East Asia Summit (EAS), 
the ASEAN Defense Ministers Plus 
process and the expanded ASEAN 
Maritime Forum.
Thus, managing great power relations 
has assumed an added urgency for 
China and has become the fulcrum 
of its diplomacy with the US since its 
new leadership took office in 2012. 
The orchestrated build-up of Xi in 
the run up to the leadership change, 
as a more self-confident and powerful 
leader capable of making big strategic 
moves, prepared the ground for 
launching China’s new orientation. 
China lost no time at the beginning 
of President Xi’s term to reset the 
fundamental direction of its relations 
with the US by announcing its foreign 
policy concept of a “New Type of Great 
Power Relations”.  The new concept, 
buttressed by China’s foreign policy 
under Xi Jinping, has effectively been 
a script characterizing China’s new 
status as the leading power in Asia, 
poised to be one of the two leading 
major powers globally, that China has 
endeavored to act out. 
The addition of a “new model of 
major country relations” as a guiding 
principle of foreign policy has sent 
the Chinese media, party and state 
entities, strategic community and 
indeed the entire foreign policy 
establishment into overdrive to 
explain and annotate the concept. 
Reminiscent of the campaigns 
launched by the theoretical and 
propaganda wings of the Chinese 
Communist Party in its heyday, this 
was projected as a novel concept 
developed by China to manage 
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major power relations appropriate 
to the 21st century.  The main 
characteristics have been described 
as the simultaneous presence of 
challenges and interests; coexistence 
of competition and cooperation; 
mutual respect and a win-win 
framework of relations.  Within China 
it was widely applauded as creative 
thinking to defy traditional theories on 
the inevitability of conflict associated 
with h the rise of a new power. 
China’s influential ally’s have 
also endorsed the concept as 
innovative thinking to avoid the 
so-called ‘Thucydides Trap’, that 
most dangerous period in relations 
between states when a rising power 
challenges established pre-eminent 
powers.  For instance, Kevin Rudd, 
Australia’s Prime Minister from 2007-
10, and again in 2013, has supported 
the concept as a means to avoid the 
mistakes of the early 20th century.
The idea of evaluating the 
international situation and developing 
its foreign policy and national 
security goals is consistent with 
Chinese practice since the founding 
of the PRC in 1949. Its critique of the 
existing world order is centered on 
the objective of breaking up the global 
concentration of power, while China 
views its own accumulation of power 
as just, democratic and ethical.  Thus, 
in its own transition from a position of 
isolation and relative weakness in the 
twentieth century to its emergence as a 
preeminent power, China has created 
a narrative of theoretical constructs: 
from Mao’s “strident three worlds” 
to Deng’s “setting aside disputes and 
keeping sovereignty”, “good neighbor 
policy”, “multi-polarity” and “peaceful 
rise”.  Hu Jintao’s “harmonious world’’ 
and Xi Jinping’s “China Dream” and 
“New Type of Great Power Relations” 
add to the narrative.  A thread 
running through these concepts 
propounded unilaterally in different 
eras has been China’s aim to advance 
its core interests and to achieve a 
transformation of existing power 
hierarchies. 
Significantly, the only jointly 
formulated set of guiding principles 
announced by China were the Five 
Principles, or Pancasila, coauthored 
with India in 1954.  These principles 
represented the most basic elements 
of international law, the essential 
characteristics of a new type of 
interstate relations, and were hailed 
for their universal validity in a 
resurgent developing world.  But less 
than a decade after their enunciation, 
China jettisoned these principles in its 
relations with India in 1962. Today, 
in a vastly transformed world, China 
has reinvented them to carve its way 
to regional and global leadership. 
Indeed, the “new type of great power 
relations” in essence bears close 
similarity to the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence.  It keeps open 
the discourse of equality and sovereign 
rights to project itself as a responsible 
rising power.  What has changed 
today is that instead of ideological 
grandstanding, China now focusses on 
the process of major power dialogue, 
engagement and partnership.
In conformity with this historical 
lineage, an optimistic President Xi 
raised this concept in the informal 
setting of the Sunnylands Summit 
with President Obama in June 2013. 
The core elements were stressed as 
no conflict, no confrontation, mutual 
respect, and win-win cooperation.   Xi 
had also put forward this idea earlier 
when he visited the US in February 
2012 as the Chinese Vice President. 
During that visit, he had called upon 
the two countries to work together 
to build a new type of relationship 
between major countries in the 
21st century, to set an example of 
constructive and cooperative state 
to state relations between countries 
with different political systems, 
historical and cultural backgrounds 
and economic development goals, an 
example without  precedent and one 
that would  inspire  future generations.
The groundwork for this enunciation 
was laid during several preceding 
rounds of strategic dialogue with 
the US by State Councillor and 
former Head of the International 
Liaison Department of the CCP, Dai 
Bingguo, who had also been  principal 
interlocutor with the US and Russia 
and with India on the boundary 
question.  In 2010, he tested the idea 
at the second Sino-US strategic and 
economic dialogue, when he proposed 
“China and the US should initiate, 
in an era of globalization, a new type 
of great power relations of mutual 
respect, harmonious coexistence, 
win-win relations between states 
with different social systems, cultural 
traditions and levels of development”.
Ahead of Xi’s visit in 2012, a 
compelling case was presented by Cui 
Tiankai, then Vice Foreign Minister 
and at present China’s Ambassador to 
the US.  He went so far as to say that 
for China to follow unswervingly its 
strategic choice of taking the peaceful 
road to development, a major pre-
requisite was for China and the US 
to develop a new model of bilateral 
relationship.  Based on a “win-win 
approach”, the two countries should 
cooperate in international affairs, 
maintain channels of dialogue and 
communication (including military-
to-military links), strengthen 
business ties, intensify people to 
people exchanges and uphold a 
strategic consensus that neither side 
has any territorial claims on the 
other.  He also listed the five thorny 
problems in China-US relations: 
lack of mutual trust, bottleneck of 
“core interests”, Taiwan issue, the 
imperative of treating each other as 
equals, restructuring the trade mix, 
and ensuring healthy interaction in 
Asia.  China, he concluded, respected 
US legitimate interests and expected 
the US to likewise respect China’s 
interests and concerns.
Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s address 
at the Brookings Institution in 
September 2013 explicitly singled out 
the Asia-Pacific as an experimental 
area, where the two sides could 
work together to develop such a 
relationship.  China, he said, had no 
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interest to drive the US away, while 
equivalent US respect for China’s 
interests would ensure the avoidance 
of confrontation.
Xi’s ambition to engage the US 
Administration to develop a “New 
Type of Major Power Relations” 
reflects the desire to manage the 
relationship to better accommodate 
China’s rise and pre-empt threats to 
its ability to advance its expanding 
economic and strategic interests. 
Although skeptical, the US side 
was initially receptive, as indicated 
in early statements by President 
Barack Obama and other senior 
administration officials.  
Obama and his team may have 
assumed that China could be 
persuaded to step back from 
challenging the “rebalance” to Asia, 
the cornerstone of US policy in the 
region.  However, there is now a 
growing perception that the Chinese 
position demands disproportionate 
compromises and a pre-emptive 
withdrawal by the US to accommodate 
Chinese ambitions. China for its 
part has escalated confrontation 
in East Asia and the South China 
Sea, launched initiatives like Asia 
Infrastructure Investment Bank 
and presented major new challenges 
on issues like cyber security.  These 
moves signal China’s determination 
to change the regional order in Asia, 
as much as the US “Rebalance” seeks 
to preserve it. So far, China has not 
been able to significantly advance its 
“new type of major power relations” 
with the Obama Administration, nor 
has the US been able to persuade 
China to step back from challenging 
the cornerstone of its policy in the 
Asia-Pacific.
Against this background, Xi’s state 
visit to the US was watched with great 
interest in world capitals, especially in 
the Asia-Pacific region.  Xi’s proactive 
engagement with the US business 
community and technology leaders to 
project the lure of the Chinese market 
appeared designed to trump the 
US Administration on its own turf. 
But the Xi-Obama summit has not 
brought the  “new type of major power 
relations” any closer, despite tentative 
commitments on cyberattacks.  Xi 
has reiterated China’s claim of 
sovereignty over the South China 
Sea “since ancient times”, denied that 
construction activities target or impact 
any country, and made an ambiguous 
commitment that China does not 
“intend” to pursue “militarization”.
For Asia’s emerging powers, the 
security challenges posed by China 
will thus remain paramount.  The 
absence of a balanced, region-wide 
security architecture to mediate power 
shifts and uphold a rules-based order 
is acute, rendered infeasible by a lack 
of congruence in national systems and 
security perspectives.  The revival of 
Asian power in the 21st century is 
creating “Asian anxiety” instead of 
“Asian solidarity”. It is increasingly 
clear that having long benefitted 
from the US-led international order, 
China has enjoyed a free ride to major 
power status and secured far greater 
salience for itself at the expense of an 
Asia where everyone rises.
This conjuncture must now be 
scrutinized more critically, and 
for good reason. In its external 
manifestation, Xi’s Chinese dream 
is not a benign construct.  It seeks 
to impose a hierarchical regional 
order which respects Chinese 
hegemony.  Countries like Japan and 
India must reconcile to this reality 
as Russia appear to have; the US 
must accommodate; and none can 
question China’s core interests which 
are non-negotiable.  Nowhere is the 
challenge to regional security more 
evident than in the maritime domain. 
China’s artificial islands in the South 
China Sea are changing facts on the 
ground and will potentially alter the 
naval balance of power by excising 
the maritime heart out of South East 
Asia.
Fortunately, the regional power 
equation has not yet swung irrevocably 
in China’s favor. Its controlled 
escalation, creeping expansionism 
and growing capacity for military 
coercion are giving rise to new 
security alignments and strategies 
for diplomatic, political and military 
balancing. China’s attempts (with 
Russian support) to impose a regional 
security architecture that pushes 
the US alliance based system and 
strategic partnerships among like-
minded democracies to the periphery 
are being resisted.  
India has revived its historical 
maritime interests across the Indo 
Pacific and joined the US, Japan 
and ASEAN in raising concerns 
about maritime freedoms in the 
South China Sea. Japan has adopted 
new security laws which will add 
substance to its aspiration to make 
proactive contributions to peace, 
which has been broadly welcomed in 
the region.  Trilateral constructs are 
being elevated and deepened. And 
there is still hope that ASEAN may 
retain enough cohesion to strengthen 
the EAS as the principal leaders’ 
led forum for strategic dialogue, 
security cooperation and upholding a 
normative regional order.
China would do well to understand 
that the principal constraint to its 
inexorable rise is its own aggressive, 
nationalist posture.  Alongside its 
push for a “new type of major power 
relations”, it should seriously consider 
putting forward constructive ideas 
for a “new type of emerging power 
relations” that uphold a more multi 
polar balance in Asia to secure peace, 
stability and long term prosperity.
Ambassador Neelam D. Sabharwal
Associate Professor, University of 
Maastricht.
Ambassador Hemant K. Singh
Professor for Strategic Studies, 
Indian Council for Research on 
International Economic Relations, 
New Delhi.
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What’s in a Name?: The China-US Interaction Over 
the “New Type of Major Country Relationship”
Seiichiro Takagi
When Xi Jinping’s visited the 
United States as Vice-Chairman 
of the State in February 2012 and 
proposed to establish the Xinxing 
Daguo Guanxi, or New Type of 
Major Country Relationship1 
(NTMCR), with the United States, 
it was not so apparent that he 
meant far more than simply an 
aspiration for positive relations.  It 
became increasingly clear, however, 
that this new manifestation of 
the Chinese penchant for concept-
driven management of important 
international relationships, and 
the interaction between the United 
States and China over the use 
of the concept, constituted an 
important aspect of the search for 
a new bilateral equilibrium with 
serious regional implication. Xi’s 
Washington speech was delivered 
against the backdrop of two 
important changes in the bilateral 
relationship, which had found a 
post-cold war equilibrium in the 
US engagement approach based 
on its supremacy and China’s low 
profile foreign policy, known as 
the Taoguang Yanghui, or hide 
capability and bide one’s time. 
One change was China’s shift to 
assertive pursuit of what they call 
“core (national) interests” and the 
other was the US rebalance to Asia-
Pacific.
China’s assertiveness was most 
clearly visible in the East Asian 
maritime theater, with the 
harassment of the US navy’s 
surveillance activity in the South 
China Sea in March 2009 as the 
harbinger.  Chinese harassment 
of other US naval surveillance 
activities, and of Vietnamese and 
Philippine fishing activities in the 
disputed areas continued into 2010. 
A  Chinese fishing boat rammed 
into two Japanese coast guard 
ships near the Senkakus and the 
captain was arrested in September 
2010. The shift to assertiveness, 
which represents a clear departure 
from the low profile approach, was 
motivated by several factors. The 
most significant is the heightened 
self confidence caused by China’s 
rapid rise in global economic 
status, including a swift recovery 
from the global financial crisis and 
surpassing Japan as the world’s 
largest economy after the US. The 
fact that the 2008 global financial 
crisis—originated in the US—
fuelled Chinese perceptions that 
power balance between them and 
the US was shifting in their favor. 
The Obama Administration’s initial 
accommodative approach to China 
in 2009, manifest in its decision 
to postpone Taiwan arms sale 
and President’s meeting with Dali 
Lama, reinforced these perceptions. 
The pronounced shift in China’s 
external posture, and the concerns 
expressed by its allies and friends, 
encouraged th  United States  move 
its strategic focus to the Asia-Pacific. 
The shift, first called a “pivot” and 
then a “rebalance” to Asia, further 
highlighted the drawdown in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. Compared 
with the past administrations’ 
emphasis on Asia, the Obama 
Administration’s approach 
was more comprehensive and 
ambitious. Militarily, it centered on 
a commitment to deploy 60 percent 
of the US Navy in the Pacific. 
Politically, it took the ASEAN 
Regional Forum more seriously 
than its predecessor and decided 
to participate in the East Asian 
Summit.  Economically, it proposed 
to join the ambitious Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) trade agreement 
as the next objective for selected 
partners in the region. China sensed 
the budding of a US containment 
strategy in these developments.  
Xi Jinping’s address in Washington 
in February 2012 was delivered 
in this context.  Xi called for the 
establishment of the NTMCR and for 
a common effort on four particular 
issues: mutual understanding and 
strategic trust; respect for each 
other’s core interests and significant 
concerns; structure of cooperation, 
for mutual benefit and win-win; 
and coordination and cooperation 
on international and global issues. 
Although he did not make clear 
what constituted the NTMCR, it was 
clear that the speech called on the 
U.S. to search for a new equilibrium 
in the bilateral relationship.
The US took the speech seriously. 
Xi was, after all, China’s next State 
Chairman.  State Secretary Hilary 
Clinton responded to it, in a speech 
in March 2012, by raising “the 
ancient question of what happens 
when an established power and a 
rising power meet ”. The question 
was preceded by the assertion that 
the US is attempting to “work with 
a rising power to foster its rise as an 
active contributor to global security, 
stability and prosperity while also 
sustaining and securing American 
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leadership”.   Former US Secretary 
of State Hilary Clinton appeared 
to be asking how the Chinese felt 
about the strong propensity for a 
rising power to risk war through 
challenging the established power, 
the so-called Thucydides trap.  
China’s response to this question 
came in a speech in May by Hu 
Jintao.  Hu mentioned, as the first 
of four requirements of the NTMCR, 
the need of innovative thinking to 
break down the traditional logic 
of major power confrontation and 
conflict in the history.  This point 
was elaborated on in an article 
written by Cui Tiankai, Vice Foreign 
Minister, with a junior colleague and 
published in June.  It characterizes 
the NTMCR as a relationship of 
“cooperation not confrontation, win-
win results not zero-sum game, and 
healthy competition not malicious 
rivalry”, and argued extensively for 
its realism and practicality.  
The article also examined 
difficulties to be overcome such as 
the lack of mutual strategic trust, 
mutual respect for core interests, 
and interactions in the Asia-Pacific 
(for which the US had to take 
responsibility). Interestingly, the 
article stressed that China had 
no intention to confront the US, 
and insisted that the relationship 
with the US takes “a special and 
important position in China’s 
overall diplomacy”.It also re-
emphasized the low profile (TGYH) 
approach toward the US adopted 
by China’s leaders in the past and 
suggested that this approach was 
still being practiced.  
From then on to the informal Xi-
Obama summit in California in June 
2013, China took every opportunity 
to press for the establishment of 
the NTMCR.  At the press briefing 
following the two-day informal 
meeting State Councilor Yang Jiechi 
presented the official formulation 
of the NTMCR as consisting of 
three pillars: no conflict and no 
confrontation; mutual respect for 
social system, developmental road, 
and win-win cooperation. The gist 
of the formula appeared to be to 
convince the US that China would 
avoid confrontation and to make the 
US respect China’s “core interests”, 
which had been officially defined 
in 2011 as national sovereignty, 
national security, territorial 
integrity, national unity, stability of 
its political system and sustainable 
development. 
Meanwhile, the United States 
echoed China’s intention to avoid 
the Thucydides’ trap but was 
unenthusiastic about the use of the 
term NTMCR.  In a speech delivered 
in March 2013, National Security 
Advisor Donilon challenged the 
proposition that an established 
power and a rising power are 
bound to fight a war,  but never 
referred to the NTMCR President 
Obama himself avoided the usage 
of the Chinese expression and 
used such phrases as “new model 
of cooperation between countries” 
or “new model of the US-China 
relations” to express basically the 
same thought.  It seems that what 
the U.S. was interested in was 
concrete action not words.
However, the US official treatment 
of the concept in the latter half 
of 2013 caused some confusion. 
President Obama’s statement in 
September that he and Xi agreed 
to build “a new model of great 
power relations based on practical 
cooperation and constructively 
managing our differences” was 
perceived as acceptance of the 
concept in spite of modifying 
the phrase. When National 
Security Advisor Susan Rice said 
in November that “we seek to 
operationalize a new model of major 
power relations” it was perceived 
as another sign of acceptance of 
the NTMCR concept. The term 
“operationalize” was understood to 
mean making the concept work as 
the Chinese defined it, even though 
her intention could have been 
to define the concept in terms of 
observable behavior or phenomena, 
as in the case of behavioral science, 
which is closer to the US penchant 
for focusing on concrete actions. 
In any case, Rice’s November 
statement was shortly followed by 
China’s unilateral announcement 
of the Air Defense Identification 
Zone (ADIZ) in East China Sea 
including the airspace above the 
Senkakus. The US government 
quickly announced disapproval and 
dispatched military aircraft to the 
area without prior notification. The 
exchanges over the ADIZ led to re-
examination of the US approach 
to the NTMCR concept. In early 
December Susan Rice delivered 
a speech at a human rights 
organization, clearly suggesting 
that human rights and democracy 
belongs to the US definition of  “core 
interests”. Even more explicitly, 
the Quadrennial Defense Review of 
2014 issued in February included 
the security of allies and partners, 
“respect for universal values at 
home and around the world,” and 
“an international order advanced by 
the US leadership” in the definition 
of the US “core national interest”. 
The report also made clear that the 
U.S. was not convinced that China 
intended to avoid confrontation by 
noting that “China will continue 
seeking to counter US strength” 
with its anti-access and area-denial 
(A2/AD) approach and its cyber and 
space control technologies.  These 
actions by the US signaled its own 
demanding expectations of the 
concept of  “mutual respect for core 
interest”. 
Since 2014, the US has stopped 
making explicit reference to the 
NTMCR and started to explicitly 
refute what the US considered to be 
implied in the Chinese definition of 
the term.  China, however preferred 
to report that official exchanges 
with the US continued to reaffirm 
a consensus on the NTMCR. These 
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distinct attitudes to the NTMCR 
were starkly apparent at the 
Beijing summit in November 2014, 
with Chinese media reporting 
that Obama had agreed to jointly 
establish such a relationship while 
the White House could show that 
Obama had never mentioned the 
term.  At the joint press conference 
in Beijing, Xi publicly stated that 
“the Pacific Ocean is broad enough 
to accommodate the development of 
both China and the United States”, 
which he had reportedly stated at 
the informal summit in California 
in 2013 and was interpreted as a 
proposal to divide up the Pacific 
Ocean into spheres of respective 
influence.  Whether or not Xi 
actually intended it, the notion 
of spheres of influence was flatly 
denied by Obama in his speech in 
Australia  which he visited after 
Beijing.
A similar pattern was evident during 
Xi state visit to the US in September 
2015.  Xi mentioned the NTMCR 
twice at the joint press conference 
but Obama never mentioned it. 
The press conference also suggested 
that the summit meeting had 
involved almost confrontational 
exchanges. Concerning the cyber 
security issue, Obama hailed 
the common understanding that 
neither government would “conduct 
or knowingly support cyber-enabled 
theft of intellectual property” but 
also said that the words need to be 
followed by action and suggested 
the possibility of sanctions 
against China to protect American 
companies, citizens and interests. 
He also expressed “significant 
concerns over land reclamation, 
construction and the militarization 
of disputed areas” in the South 
China Sea. 
Xi, on the other hand, insisted that 
the “islands in the South China Sea 
since ancient times are Chinese 
territory” and defended the land 
reclamation.  A Xinhua report again 
inferred that Xi had pressed his six-
point proposal for NTMCR at the 
summit, but also suggested that the 
Chinese demand for the “mutual 
respect” had been reformulated. 
As the objects of “mutual respect”, 
the Xinhua report now only 
mentions “differences in historical 
and cultural tradition, social 
institutions, road of development 
and developmental stage”. The list 
no longer included sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, not to mention 
the reference to “core interest,” 
which seems to reflect lowered 
expectations on the Chinese side.
The evolution of the US response 
to the Chinese advocacy of 
the  NTMCR resembles a piece 
of  wisdom from  Confucius, the 
ancient Chinese sage. In the 
chapter 5 of the Analects, he said, 
“At first, my way with men was to 
hear their words and give them 
credit for their conduct. Now my 
way is to hear their words, and look 
at their conduct.”2 The US has yet 
to find effective counter-measures 
to change China’s disappointing 
conduct.   China, on the other 
hand, appears to coming slowly to 
the realization that the NTMCR 
with the US as they defined it in 
2013 is an unattainable goal.  And 
as they have yet to come up with 
a new formula, the new strategic 
equilibrium is still in the process of 
evolution.
Seiichiro Takagi
Senior Adjunct Fellow, Japan 
Institute of International Affairs
1  The English translation of the term by 
both sides varied at first but it gradually 
settled on this on the Chinese side. The 
concept is referred to as the NTMCR, 
except in the case of direct quote.
2  The translation is by James Legge, and 
taken from the USC US-China Institute 
website.
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Security Outlook 2016:  
A South Korean Perspective      
Chung-in Moon  
Since its inauguration in 2013, 
the government of President Park 
Geun-hye has initiated the Kore-
an Peninsula Trust Process, which 
seeks to improve inter-Korean rela-
tions and facilitate peaceful reunifi-
cation through the promotion of ex-
change and cooperation as well as 
confidence-building. But in practice, 
the process has been rather dismal. 
As South Korea and the US con-
ducted their annual joint military 
exercise Key Resolve and military 
training Foul Eagle from January to 
April 2015, North Korea responded 
by conducting massive military ma-
neuvers and test-firing seven sur-
face-to-air missiles into the sea on 
13 March 2015.  This was the first 
time North Korea tested the SA-
5—a medium-to-high-altitude sur-
face-to-air missile—which was de-
veloped by the Soviet Union in the 
1960s.  On 11 May this year, North 
Korea claimed to have successfully 
launched a ballistic missile from a 
submarine, which its state media 
hailed as a “world-level strategic 
weapon” with an “eye-opening suc-
cess”.  Likewise, military tension 
was heightened over the Korean 
Peninsula in the first half of 2015.
With such tension notwithstand-
ing, marking the 70th anniversary 
of Korea’s liberation and nation-
al division on 15 August 2015, the 
Park Government planned an array 
of joint events with North Korea 
as a means for a possible break-
through in the stalled inter-Kore-
an relations.  Soccer and Korean 
wrestling matches, joint cultural 
and performing arts festival events, 
and religious and academic gath-
erings were proposed.  But Pyong-
yang turned them down flatly, and 
inter-Korean relations hit rock-bot-
tom. 
On 4 August, two South Korean 
soldiers were critically wounded in 
a mine blast while patrolling the 
southern part of the heavily fortified 
demilitarized zone (DMZ) in Paju, 
Gyeonggi Province.  Although no 
fatalities occurred, the incident 
shook South Korea.  After a two-day 
joint probe with the United Nations 
Command, the ROK Joint Chief of 
Staff concluded that steel springs, 
firing pins and other debris from 
the detonated devices collected 
from the scene were consistent 
with the wooden-box mines used 
by the North Korean military. 
North Korea was condemned for 
committing a nasty and intentional 
provocation and violating the 1953 
Armistice Agreement. 
Seoul’s response was firm. In 
addition to its usual rhetoric of 
retaliatory punishment, Defense 
Minister Han Min-koo increased 
psychological warfare against North 
Korea by resuming loudspeaker 
broadcasts in the DMZ, which 
were suspended in 2004 through 
mutual consensus at a North-South 
general-level talk.  The propaganda 
program, known as “Voice of 
Freedom”, broadcast such news 
as the execution of elite military 
officials and other power struggles 
within the top echelons in the North, 
the defection of senior North Korean 
military officials, information about 
freedom and democracy, and other 
regional and global issues.  Such 
broadcasts are known to have been 
South Korean President Park Guen-hye with Chinese President Xi Jinping, in Beijing, 2015.
Source: Korea.net. 
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effective in reaching as far as ten 
kilometers into the North.  Ten days 
after the incident, North Korea’s 
National Defense Commission 
officially denied its involvement in 
the landmine explosion, demanding 
Seoul provide solid proof. The 
North Korean statement said: “If 
our army really needs to achieve a 
military purpose, we would have 
used strong firearms, and not three 
units of mines.” The commission 
further warned that the North 
Korean military will stage precision 
attacks on those speakers.
The confrontation resembled a 
game of chicken awaiting a fatal 
crash, which could quickly escalate 
into something very serious.  This 
is more so because Seoul and 
Washington started an annual 
joint military exercise named the 
Eulji Freedom Guidance (UFG) 
on 17 August 2015. Although 
the exercise was by and large 
a computer simulation, 30,000 
American soldiers and 50,000 
South Korean forces participated, 
along with small numbers of troops 
from Australia, Canada, the United 
Kingdom, France and New Zealand. 
After marathon crisis talks, North 
and South Korea averted the 
brink of military confrontation 
on 25 August 2015.  North Korea 
expressed regret for the landmine 
blasts that maimed two South 
Korean soldiers and agreed to 
withdraw forces from the frontline. 
In response, South Korea also 
vowed to stop broadcasting anti-
Pyongyang propaganda across the 
border.  In addition, the negotiations 
resulted in an agreement to resume 
a reunion for separated families as 
well as expand civilian exchanges 
and cooperation.  More important 
was the reactivation of high-level 
official talks between Pyongyang 
and Seoul that were severed in 
October 2014.  Defusing a sharp 
crisis had abruptly resulted in 
greatly enhanced expectations for 
improved inter-Korean relations 
and tension reduction, but Korean 
security still remains quite 
precarious and uncertain.
Three scenarios: Escalation, 
de-escalation, status quo
A further round of crisis escalation 
is a disturbing prospect.  Pyongyang 
has recently announced that it will 
launch a rocket for the peaceful 
use of Space around 10 October 
2015, the 70th anniversary of the 
founding of the Korea Workers’ 
Party (KWP).  Contrary to North 
Korea’s claim that the rocket is to 
launch satellites and that it has 
an inherent right to launch it, the 
international community regards 
it as a violation of UN Security 
Council resolutions that ban any 
application of ballistic missile-
related technology.  If the North 
goes ahead with the launch, it is 
likely to face tougher sanctions, 
and the US would even consider 
initiating a “secondary boycott” 
that could severely damage North 
Korea’s economy by placing its 
routine trade under sanction. 
Judged on its past practices, North 
Korea may well reciprocate by 
undertaking a fourth underground 
nuclear test.  Such developments 
would invalidate the 25 August 
agreement, and heighten military 
tension due to the threatening 
peace and stability on the Korean 
Peninsula.
On the other hand, there is a chance 
for the de-escalation of tension 
through mutual concession and 
the creation of a virtuous cycle of 
confidence-building and improved 
bilateral relations between Seoul 
and Pyongyang, and Washington 
and Pyongyang.  This scenario 
could become plausible when and 
if the North takes a more prudent 
and cooperative attitude by not 
only aborting its launch plan, but 
also implementing the 25 August 
2015 agreement by holding the 
reunion of separated families as 
scheduled and promoting civilian 
exchanges and cooperation. The 
South can reciprocate by lifting the 
ban on the Mt. Geumgang tourist 
project, as well as relaxing the 24 
May measures.  President Park, 
who planned to visit the US on 
16 October, could easily persuade 
President Barack Obama to 
resume a dialogue with Pyongyang, 
fostering a virtuous cycle of 
constructive interactions among 
South Korea, North Korea and the 
US. But the plausibility of this 
scenario seems rather dim.  
Finally, an in-between scenario 
has some credibility.  Despite 
Pyongyang’s rocket launch, Seoul 
abides by the 25 August agreement, 
and carries out the reunion of 
separated families and retains 
official channels of communication 
with the North. In a similar 
vein, the Park government could 
become more prudent in imposing 
sanctions against the North. Such 
a flexible stance by Seoul could 
prevent Pyongyang’s additional 
brinkmanship diplomacy and 
mitigate a hardline military posture. 
Domestic and international political 
pressures may well prevent the 
Park government from taking such 
a reconciliatory stance.  Thus, if 
North Korea launches the rocket, 
the status quo scenario might be 
less likely, in which case the overall 
security situation would become 
worse and more complicated. 
Although some analysts predict a 
potential security crisis, followed 
by the collapse of the North Korean 
regime, it seems highly unlikely in 
the short run.   
Stalled Six Party Talks 
and North Korea’s nuclear 
ambitions
Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions will 
continue to pose a major threat to 
South Korea’s security throughout 
2016.  While the Six Party Talks 
have been stalled since 2009, North 
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Korea has been strengthening its 
nuclear weapons capability by 
increasing its stock of plutonium 
and diversifying into uranium 
enrichment.  If left unchecked, 
North Korea is expected to acquire 
more than 100 nuclear warheads 
in the coming decade.  It has also 
undertaken three underground 
nuclear tests, and has significantly 
enhanced its delivery capabilities. 
Worse, North Korean leader Kim 
Jong Un pledged to push for the 
“Byongjin Line” —a policy that aims 
to pursue economic development and 
nuclear weapons simultaneously. 
Pyongyang has declared itself as 
the ninth nuclear weapons state in 
the world, which would jeopardize 
security on the Korean Peninsula, 
trigger a nuclear domino effect in 
the region and threaten the global 
nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Major stakeholders have remained 
inactive and even helpless in the 
face of North Korea’s intensifying 
nuclear threat.  After the third nu-
clear test in February 2013, Pyong-
yang called for the immediate re-
sumption of the Six Party Talks 
without any preconditions, which 
was partly orchestrated by the Chi-
nese government.  On January 9, 
2015, the North made another pro-
posal to suspend its missile launch-
ing and nuclear testing and to make 
additional concessions if the US and 
South Korea halted joint military 
exercises and training.  But Wash-
ington rejected the offer instantly. 
Under its “strategic patience” poli-
cy, the Obama administration has 
maintained that it won’t talk with 
Pyongyang unless it comes with a 
sincere attitude and commitment 
to nuclear disarmament. The US 
also insists that the North must 
abandon its Byongjin policy.  South 
Korea and Japan have taken sides 
with the US.  
As host of the Six Party Talks, Chi-
na has been trying to narrow the 
gap between North Korea and the 
US, but has so far failed.  If North 
Korea refrains from any further 
provocation such as a fourth nucle-
ar test, China has insisted that the 
concerned parties should resume 
the Six Party Talks, while urging 
the US and South Korea to low-
er the bar for North Korea to join 
diplomatic talks by avoiding unnec-
essary provocations such as joint 
South Korea-US military drills and 
by reopening the Six Party platform 
immediately without any conditions 
attached.  But Seoul and Washing-
ton have not taken Beijing’s offer 
seriously, and Pyongyang has also 
been distancing itself from Beijing. 
As China’s influence is limited, 
prospects for the Six Party Talks 
become even more dim.  Failure to 
resolve the North Korean nuclear 
problem through dialogue and ne-
gotiations will hinder the process of 
inter-Korean confidence-building, 
and eventually precipitate a cat-
astrophic security outcome on the 
Korean Peninsula. 
Walking a tightrope? 
Another security concern could 
arise from China’s strategic 
rivalry with the US.  Since 2010, 
the Obama Administration has 
been pursuing a “Pivot” to Asia 
strategy, as a means of balancing 
the rise of China.  As a staunch 
ally, South Korea is expected to 
join the American balancing efforts 
along with Japan and other allies 
in the region. But Seoul has been 
somewhat ambiguous in its strategic 
positioning. Growing economic 
dependence on China as well as 
Beijing’s influence over Pyongyang 
have made the Park government 
take a more prudent and balanced 
foreign policy between the two 
giants, seeking to harmonize a 
dependable ROK-US alliance and 
developing a strategic cooperative 
partnership with China.  
But recent moves by President 
Park have generated concerns 
in Washington and Tokyo 
that Seoul is tilting toward—
if not bandwagoning—with 
China.  American opposition 
notwithstanding, South Korea 
joined the Asia Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB).  The 
Park government has also shown a 
rather hesitant attitude regarding 
an American plan to deploy the 
Terminal High-Altitude Area 
Defense (THAAD) system in South 
Korea, which is designed to shoot 
down incoming short, medium, and 
intermediate ballistic missiles from 
the North, partly due to China’s 
sensitive reaction.  Most recently, 
on 3 September, President Park 
attended a ceremony in Beijing 
celebrating the 70th anniversary 
of China’s victory against Japan 
and the international war against 
fascism.  She was the only leader 
among American allies and friends 
who attended the Victory Day 
ceremony and parade. 
Pundits in Tokyo and Washington 
have accused President Park of 
taking an opportunistic attitude 
toward China, compromising 
the alliance with the US. Such 
accusations seem unfair and overly 
simplified.  As to the AIIB, other 
American allies such as Australia 
joined, and Seoul is known to 
have had a full discussion with 
Washington before it made the 
decision.  And the American 
government has not yet officially 
proposed the deployment of 
THADD.  President Park had 
a close consultation with the 
Obama administration before her 
visit to Beijing in September.  In 
Beijing, she secured an impressive 
array of achievements that are 
beneficial for both South Korea 
and the US, which included closer 
policy consultation between Seoul 
and Beijing; a commitment by 
the leadership of both countries 
to the denuclearization of North 
Korea; reducing the risks of acute 
tensions on the Korean peninsula; 
candid discussion over the Korean 
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unification; and an agreement 
on the resumption of a trilateral 
summit among the ROK, China, 
and Japan in late October or early 
November this year. It is true that 
South Korea under the Park’s 
leadership has been walking a tight 
rope between China and the US. 
But Park’s priority has been the 
US, and will continue be so for the 
remainder of her tenure in office.   
South Korea has a mixed security 
outlook in 2016.  Whereas President 
Park is likely to manage bilateral 
relations with China and the United 
States relatively well, inter-Korean 
relations will remain hyperbolic, 
oscillating between conflict and 
cooperation.  Prospects for a 
negotiated settlement of the North 
Korean nuclear issue appear bleak, 
threatening peace and stability on 
the Korean Peninsula.  The security 
dilemma will continue to haunt 
South Korea throughout 2016.
Professor Chung-in Moon
Department of Political Science, 
Yonsei University.
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The Regional Security Outlook for 2016:  
A View From Thailand
Kavi Chongkittavorn
The fluidity of the regional and 
international security environment 
has been exemplified by increased 
tension between the US and China, 
the world’s two biggest economies. 
This feature will continue unabated 
in the years, if not decades, to 
come due to the unprecedented 
rise in China’s economic strength 
and influence over the past three 
decades. The US—which has been 
the dominant power in the Asia-
Pacific since the end of World War 
II, is now being challenged both 
economically and strategically. 
Unlike Russia, America’s main rival 
in the past, China’s rise enjoys wider 
support from networks of developing 
countries and millions of Chinese 
diaspora around the world. With its 
sheer size of population and economy, 
China’s economic performance is 
now considered the key indicator of 
the well-being of the global economy. 
Imperative to regional security is 
that the Association of South East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries 
assess and respond intelligently to 
this new international environment.
ASEAN balances the US-China 
competition
Both the US and China are major 
dialogue partners of ASEAN. 
Although the US was among the 
first batch of dialogue partner to join 
ASEAN back in 1977, the overall 
ASEAN-US relationship is no match 
for the one with China that will 
commemorate its 25th anniversary 
of diplomatic relations in 2016. 
China has the most comprehensive 
engagements with ASEAN with a 
total of 44 committees at various 
levels, including the summit, 
ministerial, senior officials, experts 
and working levels.  In comparison, 
the US has only 19 committees 
altogether covering the whole gamut 
of their bilateral cooperation.  While 
China was awarded the status of 
having a “strategic partnership” 
in 2003, the US has not yet been 
accorded such a privilege due to “the 
lack of substantive contributions” to 
ASEAN. 
This perception might appear odd, 
given the longstanding US military 
presence in the region but makes 
more sense when viewed strictly 
from an ASEAN perspective.  It took 
Washington 18-years to accede to 
the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
(1976) when ASEAN opened up 
this regional code of conduct for 
non-ASEAN signatories in 1992. 
China was first to acceded in 2003, 
along with India. It was only in 
2012 that the US-ASEAN summit 
was institutionalized after years of 
negotiations due to Washington’s 
hesitations. China and ASEAN have 
already held 17 full summits. At the 
moment, Japan, China, South Korea, 
India and Australia are all strategic 
partners with ASEAN.  New Zealand 
will become the sixth during the 
ASEAN-New Zealand Summit in 
November 2015 in Kuala Lumpur in 
recognition of Wellington’s enormous 
efforts to strengthen bilateral ties. 
Washington has a lot of catching up 
to do.
At the end of 2011, the Obama 
Administration initiated the 
rebalancing policies towards the 
Asia-Pacific to strengthen its 
economic and military ties among 
the alliances, friends and even 
A US Marine pilot enters the cockpit of an F/A-18 Hornet, during a training exercise with 
the Royal Thai Air Force, 16 February 2015. Source: US Marine Corps.
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former foes.  Now that nearly four 
years have elapsed, the results 
are mixed at best—as the Obama 
administration has been jumping 
from one international crisis to the 
other, especially during its second 
term.  The US has successfully 
deepened and broadened security 
cooperation with the Philippines, 
after years of negligence, following 
Manila’s request for a stronger US 
security commitment to counter 
China’s growing assertiveness 
in the South China Sea.  Indeed, 
the enhanced US-Philippines 
cooperation has already impacted on 
Manila’s attitude toward ASEAN, 
which it helped found in 1967.  
Since the tension over the maritime 
stand-off between the Philippines and 
China over the Scarborough Shoals 
in 2012, the government of President 
Beningo Aquino III has opted for more 
assistance from Washington and in 
the process overlooked the role of 
ASEAN and its effort to engage with 
China in managing the conflict after 
both sides concluded the Declaration 
on the Conduct of Parties Concerned 
in the South China Sea in 2002. 
Its unilateral effort has strained 
Manila’s ties with ASEAN and has 
left the impression that ASEAN is a 
paper tiger and is not willing to stand 
up against China.  Manila’s decision 
to seek international arbitration did 
not have consensus support within 
ASEAN.
In a stark contrast, Vietnam, which 
has a long history of border disputes 
with China, has relied on a dual-
track approach.  The first priority 
is to work with ASEAN and engage 
China collectively. This will continue 
to be a slow and long-haul process. 
That helps explain why Vietnam’s 
diplomatic behavior has been 
careful and consistent, seeking to 
stress, discreetly but forcefully that 
ASEAN should have a central role in 
managing this regional conflict. For 
the one thing, Vietnam has never 
belittled ASEAN and its limited 
bargaining power.  Instead, Hanoi 
often credits the grouping’s collective 
effort, especially toughening the 
ASEAN joint communique over the 
South China Sea dispute.  At the 
same time, Vietnam and the US have 
also boosted their relations in terms 
of security and strategic cooperation 
to new heights, notwithstanding 
their long history as adversaries.  
As a member of the US-led Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP), Vietnam 
has enjoyed unprecedented support 
from Washington, through the 
easing of arms supply sanctions 
and other goodwill gestures.  Major 
hurdles over sensitive issues such as 
labor standards and human rights 
have been worked out to enable 
Vietnam to join TPP when it is ready, 
much to the chagrin of other ASEAN 
members who are also the TPP 
members.  Both the Philippines and 
Thailand, the two ASEAN military 
allies of the US, have expressed 
interest in joining the TPP.
The US rebalancing strategy is 
undoubtedly essentially to counter 
the growing influence of China in the 
region.  But it is unlikely that it will 
be sustainable over the longer-term 
due to China’s proximity, active 
engagement, its huge market and 
its multi-facet cooperation schemes. 
China is the biggest importer of 
ASEAN products, and in recent 
years has also become a major source 
of direct foreign investment.  With 
huge infrastructure projects planned 
both within the ASEAN framework 
(known as Master Plan of ASEAN 
Connectivity) and China’s Belt and 
Road Initiatives, the potential for 
cooperation is enormous. 
The Asian Development Bank has 
estimated that ASEAN needs  well 
over US$60 billion annually need for 
infrastructure projects.  The quick 
and successful establishment of Asia 
Infrastructure Investment Bank 
early this year is a clear barometer 
of future China’s indispensable role 
in promoting economic growth in 
Asia and beyond.  Growing economic 
interdependence into the future 
will also promote China’s strategic 
values, a consideration that has 
been essentially absent in the 
region since the end of World War 
II.  For China, this is still a work in 
rapid progress.  Huge adjustments 
still have to be made to align and, 
hopefully, synergize the combined 
visions of ASEAN and China.
ASEAN’s dilemma
This emerging trend constitutes a 
strategic dilemma for the members 
of ASEAN.  Take Thailand as a case 
study.  For decades, it has maintained 
a balanced policy towards the 
two super powers.  Thailand is 
America’s oldest regional ally, and 
was a bulwark against the spread 
of communism throughout the Cold 
War.  The fall of the Berlin Wall 
and an era of enemy deprivation 
has reduced Thailand’s strategic 
value to the US greatly.  This has 
consequently pushed Thailand 
away from the America’s security 
radar.  The 33-year old Cobra 
Gold exercise—the region’s biggest 
military exercise—remains the only 
significant manifestation of the US-
Thai military alliance. In its early 
days, this annual exercise, which 
may have been spared cancelation 
by the Thailand’s military power 
seizure in May 2014, was aimed to 
counter the threats from communist 
neighbors.  Now it has developed 
into a multinational operation 
involving thousands of troops from 
more than two-dozen countries in 
the Asia-Pacific including China and 
Myanmar.
Since the May 2014 coup, US-Thai 
relations have been on hold.  China 
and other powers have moved 
decisively to improve their ties 
with Thailand. China has been 
the biggest beneficiary as it moves 
quickly to support the military 
administration under the leadership 
of Prime Minister General Prayuth 
Chan-ocha. Both sides have 
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already achieved unprecedented 
level of friendship and cooperation, 
especially in forging closer defense 
and security ties: a memorandum 
of understanding for joint military 
exercises has been signed and major 
arms deals are in the pipeline. 
As Thailand focuses on resolving 
political polarization, ensuring 
national reconciliation and stability, 
the US continues to press for the 
early conduct of general elections 
and a return to civilian rule. 
Washington’s “take it or leave it” 
demand has already alienated the 
top echelons of the Thai military, 
the group that once ensured close 
defence cooperation with the US. 
Anti-US public sentiment has 
been on rise due to the perception 
that Washington is interfering in 
domestic affairs.  Worse, frequent 
insulting comments from the US 
State Department rubs salt into the 
wounds, leaving the region’s closest 
ally without an ambassador on the 
ground for nearly ten-months.     
Clearly, Thailand will continue 
to serve as a conduit for China’s 
inroads into ASEAN as well as the 
mainland Southeast Asia by the 
virtue of its geostrategic location 
and friendly relations.  The Thai 
attitude towards both the US and 
China is being watched closely by 
other ASEAN colleagues.  From 
2012-2015, Thailand served as 
a coordinator of ASEAN-China 
relations, and earned praise for 
bringing progress to  the ongoing 
process to draft a binding code of 
conduct  for the South China Sea. 
Singapore will coordinate ASEAN-
China relations from 2015-2018, and 
will face the daunting task to move 
the process further.  
It is difficult to predict what will 
transpire in the near term.  China 
understands well that strong and 
positive ASEAN-China ties are a 
prerequisite for its growing regional 
and international profile.  Without 
ASEAN goodwill and trust, it would 
be extremely difficult for China to 
proceed on its own, especially in the 
Asia-Pacific where there is fierce 
competition from the US.
Last year, Beijing proposed that 
ASEAN and China conclude a Treaty 
of Good Neighborliness, Friendship 
and Cooperation.  This marked the 
first time that Beijing put forward 
such a collective security framework, 
challenging the well-established US-
led strategic framework in place for 
nearly six decades in this part of 
the world.  President Xi has made 
clear that ASEAN and China can 
aspire to a new type of relationship, 
especially on security matters—
the notion that the security in Asia 
should  be handled by Asians.  With 
the South China Sea dispute high on 
the ASEAN agenda, it may be some 
time before any serious dialogue on 
this matter could be initiated. Deep 
down, there is still a trust deficit that 
must be overcome before a serious 
dialogue on a China-led security 
framework is placed on the table. 
Unsurprisingly, however, ASEAN 
has expressed its willingness to 
study the Chinese proposal, and for 
this purpose a working group will be 
set up and led by Indonesia.  Russia, 
India and Indonesia have also 
submitted their separate proposals 
on collective security cooperation. 
These efforts demonstrate succinctly 
major powers’ enormous interest to 
contribute to the emerging regional 
security architecture. The question 
is: Does ASEAN have the mettle to 
take up this formidable challenge?
Strengthening ASEAN 
centrality
ASEAN needs to get its house in 
order and ensure that the grouping 
can speak in one voice on global 
issues, especially through ASEAN-
led platforms, and in international 
arena.  The grouping must promote 
ASEAN centrality in every possible 
way and whenever it can.  At the 
upcoming 2015 East Asia Summit 
(EAS) in November in Kuala 
Lumpur, ASEAN leaders need to 
be more pro-active in setting the 
agenda and shaping the outcomes 
of discussions among the leaders 
from the US, Russia, China, Japan, 
India, South Korea, Australia and 
New Zealand., ASEAN is frequently 
criticized for wasteful formalities 
and its failure to take clear positions 
or address serious matters directly, 
especially emerging crises.  Last year, 
the issues of violent extremists and 
the Ebola pandemic dominated the 
EAS agenda.  Fortunately, ASEAN 
leaders were resilient enough to 
rise to the challenge.  In years to 
come, ASEAN will have to take 
opportunities to tackle cross-border 
issues such as irregular migrants, 
violent extremists and terrorism, 
climate change, humanitarian and 
disaster management.
As the date for the declaration of 
ASEAN Community—31 December 
2015—approaches, it is imperative 
that ASEAN leaders display stronger 
leadership and the collective political 
will needed to accelerate further 
economic, political and socio-cultural 
integration.  This will constitute 
the internal dimension of ASEAN 
centrality—the bedrock of ASEAN 
leadership.  To succeed,the existing 
development gap between the new 
and old members—which remains 
a big stumbling block for a stronger 
community building—must be 
addressed with focus and urgency. 
Otherwise, a fully integrated and 
cohesive ASEAN will remain elusive. 
ASEAN understands full-well that in 
the decades to come, its main priority 
is to manage its relationships with the 
US and China, and evade becoming a 
hostage or pawn in their contestation 
for bigger spheres of influence.
Kavi Chongkittavorn
Senior Fellow, Institute of Security 
and International Studies, 
Chulalongkorn University.
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Tensions in the South China Sea 
are not new.  Territorial claims 
have been a feature for some time. 
While under international law, 
such acts have no legal validity 
in terms of proof of ownership—
especially when they were executed 
long after the critical date or the 
date where disputes initially came 
into being. Despite these legalities, 
claimant states continue to make 
national territorial claims, often 
for domestic or subtle strategic 
purposes. 
Escalations in the South China 
Sea can be traced back to the 
1970s, which were closely tied to 
regional strategic development. 
Yet the latest escalation—which 
began in 2009—is different. As 
opposed to the situation some forty 
years ago, Southeast Asia today is 
characterized by a dense network 
of linkages that have become an 
important platform for regional 
cooperation and cohesion. 
By adopting Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
Charter in 2009, the Association 
has matured and morphed into 
rules-based organization.  Since 
China acceded to ASEAN’s Treaty 
of Amity and Cooperation in 2010, 
ASEAN-China relations have been 
largely positive and have developed 
into a much more structured 
engagement from the Track One to 
the Track Two level.  Buttressing 
the relationship between ASEAN 
and China is their agreement on a 
Declaration of a Code of Conduct 
on South China Sea. While the 
progress may not be as fast as 
hoped by many, engagement in the 
process has become an important 
platform for countries to exchange 
communication. 
However, the latest reclamations 
on at least six reefs in the South 
China Sea by China has been 
viewed by many analysts as a 
major escalation of the dispute. 
These analysts feel that this 
new development could dampen 
relations between China and 
ASEAN claimant states and could 
possibly have negative implications 
for the management of the dispute 
itself.
Furthermore, ASEAN has 
successfully launched and 
managed the East Asia Summit, 
wherein major global powers have 
discussed strategic matters and 
other important regional issues 
at the same table with ASEAN. 
Indeed, there is now an ASEAN-
led security dialogue in addition 
to US-led security dialogue in the 
region.
In recent decades, the socio-
economic conditions of Southeast 
and East Asian countries have also 
changed enormously.  Four regional 
countries are member of the G-20, 
and ASEAN’s combined GDP of 
US$2.3 trillion is larger than that 
of India or Russia.  If ASEAN could 
agree on a status similar to the 
European Union, the Association 
could be sitting at the G-20 table.  A 
number of economic organizations 
have predicted that this region will 
become the locomotive of global 
Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: 
Options for Peaceful Settlement*
Arif Havas Oegroseno
China’s nine-dash line claim in the South China Sea. Source: UNCLOS..
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economic growth, with many 
countries seeing their GDP triple 
or even quadruple by 2050.  Such 
prediction in the Asian Century 
have rightfully attracted both 
jubilation and cynicism. 
The threats of 40 years ago that 
stemmed mainly from regional wars 
driven by ideological differences 
among nations have completely 
gone.  Today, the threats stem 
from climate change, pandemics, 
as well as the borderless war 
on terrorism.  Organized crime 
syndicates have become much 
more sophisticated, often moving 
faster than states, especially with 
the lack of regional extradition 
arrangements.  Countries in the 
region have found that they must 
work collaborative to address these 
new forms of threat.
Contrary to some who view the 
international rules of the game in 
respect of oceans as designed by and 
for the Western powers, the United 
Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982 was 
ratified by countries in Southeast 
and East Asia.  This represents a 
global consensus that was achieved 
with the strong participation of 
developing states. UNCLOS is a 
major legal innovation for states 
like Indonesia and the Philippines, 
because it developed the core legal 
principles for archipelagic waters. 
The global agenda is no longer 
being dictated by the established 
global powers.  Countries in our 
region are also playing a strong 
role in shaping global norms.
Furthermore, the culture of 
international law has started to 
take root in this region as seen by 
the signing of numerous maritime 
boundaries treaties, settlement 
of disputes by the International 
Court of Justice, and the relocation 
of many international organization 
to the region.  In addition, 
the business of international 
arbitration is growing, not to 
mention the settlement of major 
political disputes with external 
contributions, as in the case of the 
Aceh Peace Process.
Clearly, the strategic environment 
in which the tensions between South 
China Sea claimant states take 
place today is significantly different 
from forty years ago in virtually all 
respects: regional security, socio-
economic development, threat 
spectrum, as well as the norms 
and rules governing state conduct 
at the regional and global levels. 
Prevailing norms and conventions 
along with the extensive network 
of political, social and economic 
connections between all states 
constitutes a natural barrier to 
tensions escalating into open war. 
New major initiatives
Recently, China launched a massive 
new connectivity program called 
the Maritime Silk Road of the 
21st Century.  This initiative was 
publicly announced in 2013 in 
Indonesia, the largest archipelago 
in the world.  For such an ambitious 
program to succeed, China needs 
the collaboration and support of 
countries in Southeast Asia.  If 
Southeast Asia resembled the 
Middle East there would be no great 
economic achievement in East Asia. 
If the Malacca Straits and Singapore 
were run by ISIS and pirates, double 
digit growth in East Asia would be 
unimaginable. 
While on one hand major strategic 
changes have taken place and played 
an important role in restraining 
the tensions, particularly in the 
South China Sea, the deeper belief 
in the region is that these strategic 
changes should have played an 
even more decisive role in removing 
the tensions and resolving the 
dispute once and for all.  Territorial 
sovereignty disputes are invariably 
colored with nationalism and 
patriotism, and are correspondingly 
difficult to resolve. 
Resolution of overlapping 
claims in the South China Sea
All territorial sovereignty disputes 
have been settled through third party 
adjudication or arbitration.  Examples 
in our region include the Sipadan-
Ligitan case involving Malaysia and 
Indonesia, and the Pedra Branca-
Batu Puteh case involving Malaysia 
and Singapore.  Third party 
settlement requires a voluntary 
mechanism whereby concerned 
parties enter into agreement to 
set the terms of references and 
modalities before allowing the third 
party to commence the legal process 
of settling the territorial disputes.
With five claimants countries—
Brunei, China, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Vietnam—holding 
overlapping claims to hundreds of 
natural features in the South China 
Sea, the prospect of actually settling 
dispute through adjudication or 
arbitration is very slim.  However, 
all claimants are legally obliged to 
settle the dispute in peaceful manner 
and without resorting to the use or 
threat of use of force, as stipulated 
by Article 2 of the United Nations 
Charter, the ASEAN Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation and the Declaration 
on the Code of Conduct in the South 
China Sea.  The 1970 United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution 2625 on 
the Declaration of Friendly Relations 
specifically states that “no territorial 
acquisition resulting from the threat 
of use of force shall be recognized as 
legal”. 
Since all of the claimant countries 
are not likely to bring their case to 
adjudication, they could resort to 
various different dispute settlement 
mechanisms.  Article 33 of the 
United Nations Charter describes 
such mechanisms, additional to 
arbitration or judicial settlement, 
as negotiation, enquiry, mediation, 
conciliation, regional agencies or 
arrangements, or other peaceful 
means of their own choice.
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It is difficult to imagine the 
settlement of territorial disputes 
through negotiation. Indonesia tried 
this approach in the Sipadan-Ligitan 
dispute.  Both Indonesia and Malaysia 
were locked in endless exchanges of 
historical and old-map arguments. 
Even the idea of co-ownership found 
little favour.  The leadership in both 
countries was eventually able to look 
to the bilateral and regional benefits 
beyond a settlement of the dispute 
and opted for adjudication by the ICJ. 
Enquiry, mediation and conciliation 
are forms of initial steps towards 
a deeper negotiation with the 
assistance of a third party.  Since 
Indonesia is not a claimant state in 
the South China Sea—the nearest 
disputed features are over 300 
nautical miles from its territory—
Indonesia is experienced at 
practicing neutrality. 
Article 33 of the United Nations 
Charter also stipulated regional 
arrangement as means to settle 
disputes.  For example, ASEAN’s 
TAC includes a dispute settlement 
mechanism.  All five claimant states 
are party to the TAC.  However, 
regardless of the mechanisms 
available to settle territorial 
disputes, the most important factor 
will always be the political courage 
among claimant states to commit 
to settling a dispute with the 
involvement of a third party.
Unfortunately, although there are 
on-going efforts to manage the 
likely consequences of the territorial 
disputes in the South China Sea, 
the actual settlement of these 
dispute is not on the agenda of any 
negotiations. 
High probability of managing 
the disputes in the South 
China Sea
In 1979, China formally proposed 
to Japan that the two countries set 
aside the question of sovereignty 
over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands 
and agree to jointly develop 
the resources adjacent to these 
islands.  While this approach was 
subsequently endorsed by all the 
participants in the workshops 
conducted by Indonesia since 1990 
on managing potential conflicts in 
the South China Sea, a number 
of practical difficulties proved all 
but insurmountable: the area or 
exact location of the proposed joint 
development; the operators of the 
proposed joint development; risk 
and profit sharing; and dispute 
settlement procedures. Article 6 
of the 2002 ASEAN plus China 
declaration on the conduct of 
parties in the South China Sea also 
stipulates that cooperative activities 
may be undertaken pending 
a comprehensive and durable 
settlement.  To date, however, not 
a single long-standing cooperative 
activity in this area has been 
implemented.
On the other hand, Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Singapore manage to 
cooperate closely on ensuring the 
smooth functioning of the Malacca/
Singapore Straits even though not 
all of the maritime boundary and 
sovereignty issues between them 
have been settled.  Similarly, in 2007, 
six countries, namely Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, the 
Philippines, Timor-Leste and the 
Solomon Islands agreed to establish 
a multilateral partnership—The 
Coral Triangle Initiative (CTI) —to 
address threats to the coral reefs 
in their waters that account for 76 
percent of the world’s known coral 
species.  Again, major sectors of the 
maritime boundaries between these 
states remain limited.
In this light, ASEAN and China 
could consider entering into a 
dialogue with the CTI and also 
with the three managers of the 
Malacca/Singapore Straits to get 
first-hand information and practical 
experience.  These collaborative 
activities must continue to take 
shape with a view to be applicable to 
the disputes in the South China Sea. 
Arif Havas Oegroseno
Former Indonesian Ambassador 
to Belgium, Luxembourg and the 
European Union
* Adapted from the author’s article, “ State 
Practices in South East Asia: Possible 
Collaboration Amongst Claimants of 
South China Sea Dispute”, originally pub-
lished in the Indonesian Quarterly, vol.43, 
no. 2, 2015. Reprinted with permission.
A MV-22B Osprey helicopter lands on the amphibious dock ship USS Green Bay LPD 20), 
West Philippines Sea, Philippines, 23 April 2015. Source: US Marine Corps.
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Both the Mediterranean and 
Andaman Sea’s have been beset 
with similar displacement crises 
over the past year.  In both 
areas, ‘irregular’ migration has 
been driven by war, conflict and 
attendant civil strife, forcing 
those who felt persecuted and 
endangered to seek shelter and 
better livelihoods elsewhere 
through geographical proximity 
and commercially-organized people 
smuggling as well as all other 
available means of escape.  Yet 
the apparent similarities between 
the two regions belie at least two 
fundamental differences.  First, 
the Mediterranean migration 
crisis stems from intractable civil 
conflict and communal violence in 
the Middle East and North Africa 
with no regional framework of 
mitigation and regulation.  Second, 
migrants from these violence-
infested regions of deep-seated 
tribal tensions who seek refuge in 
wealthier and welfare-providing 
European countries face opposition 
from indigenous populations 
whose developed economies and 
growth prospects are expanding 
at a slower trend growth, with 
swathes of recession and fiscal 
austerity throughout, especially in 
the Eurozone countries.
To be sure, the Andaman sources 
of irregular migration challenges 
are no doubt severe and pose non-
traditional security concerns and 
policy priorities for the adjoining 
states and parties involved.  But 
the Andaman irregular migrants—
otherwise known as the Rohingya 
‘boat people’ from Myanmar’s 
western Rakhine state and from 
Bangladesh itself—have been 
trying to enter countries where 
economic development is still 
steady and the outlook promising.  A 
portion of the labour pool of Muslim 
Rohingya’s and Bangladeshis 
from the Andaman area can thus 
be absorbed, in particular, by 
predominantly Muslim Indonesia 
and Malaysia.  The rest, however, 
would have to find resettlement 
in third countries or be returned 
to their home countries.  The 
Rohingya/Bangladeshi irregular 
migration challenges can also be 
addressed, up to a point, within 
the ASEAN framework.  So far, 
ASEAN has not been effective 
in handling and responding to 
this humanitarian challenge on 
the one hand and transnational 
crime (human smuggling) on the 
other.  This essay aims to lay out 
ASEAN’s limitations and dilemmas 
in coming to terms with the 
Rohingya/Bangladeshi migratory 
predicament.  Ultimately, irregular 
migration in the Andaman may 
be intractable and can only 
be mitigated among origin, 
destination and transit countries. 
Prevention of persecution and 
migration at the source—that 
is, Myanmar’s Rakhine state 
and Bangladesh—would require 
economic development and 
domestic peace and stability that 
ASEAN has neither the capacity 
nor authority to provide, or other 
broader frameworks. 
The ‘Boat People’ Crisis:  
Promoting Regulation and Mitigation
Thitinan Pongsudhirak
Fishing boat carrying Rohingya and Bangladeshi migrants is pulled to shore by Achenese 
fisherman off the coast of Julok, Aceh, Indonesia, 20 May 2015.  Source: Rohingya Blogger.
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The Andaman ‘boat people’ in 
regional perspective
In May 2015, global news headlines 
were fixated with the many 
thousands of so-called ‘boat people’ 
who were stuck in the vast Andaman 
Sea straddling South and Southeast 
Asia engaged in a risky escape from 
their homelands in pursuit of jobs 
and better livelihoods.  Taking 
extreme risks under squalid 
conditions with an uncertain 
fate, these waves of boat people s 
shone the international spotlight 
on longstanding regional human 
smuggling networks along with the 
persecution and poverty of hapless 
victims in western Myanmar and 
Bangladesh.  Tracing their origins, 
handling their sufferings at sea and 
finding longer-term solutions posed 
regional challenges for the countries 
involved and for the international 
community more broadly.  The 
flight and plight of these boat people 
in the Andaman Sea became—and 
will continue to pose—a conundrum 
which must be overseen and 
mitigated by a regional framework 
with international backing that 
goes beyond any single country. 
It has been established that loads 
of people from the areas in the 
vicinity of Bangladesh and western 
Myanmar traversed the adjacent 
sea-lanes in rickety fishing boats 
towards Thailand, Malaysia and 
Indonesia.  Their geographic 
origins, ethnic makeup, destination 
aims and future aspirations were 
a matter of contention among the 
countries in question.  Whether to 
call them migrants, refugees, or 
asylum seekers, let alone ‘Rohingya’, 
‘Bengali’ or ‘Bangladeshi’, is 
similarly contentious.  Yet it was 
unmistakable that the boat people 
were exploited by a hidden, illicit 
regional trade in labor involving 
physical maltreatment and abuse by 
avaricious and cruel middlemen, with 
the collusion of corrupt authorities 
from the countries concerned.  It was 
evident in view of the risks taken 
and hardship conditions endured 
that the boat people were escaping 
conditions of poverty and/or 
persecution.  Moreover, the issue of 
the boat people became politicized at 
the regional, bilateral and domestic 
levels, while lacking international 
consensus for better handling.  That 
much was agreed. The rest, however, 
became murky and disputed, and 
remains to be worked out.
Myanmar was at the centre of the 
controversy. It was conventionally 
understood that the vast majority 
of the boat people derive from 
Myanmar’s Rakhine state, where 
they were a persecuted Muslim 
minority whom the country’s 
Buddhist majority deeply 
detested and whom the Myanmar 
government refused to recognize 
with proper citizen and residential 
rights.  The boat people crisis stoked 
old wounds of political confrontation 
within Myanmar between the 
military-dominated government and 
dissident groups inside and outside 
the country who have opposed 
Myanmar’s reform path since 
August 2011.  Dissident groups 
seized on the opportunity to pounce 
on Myanmar’s government and the 
opposition alike, not sparing even 
the iconic Aung San Suu Kyi for 
not speaking up for the ‘Rohingya’ 
boat people.  For most Myanmar 
people, however, the Rohingya 
are not the problem as these are 
‘Bengali’ denizens who should be 
returned to Bangladesh.  Myanmar 
was thus lukewarm towards any 
regional framework to deal with the 
boat people because most Myanmar 
people, government and opposition 
do not recognize the Rohingya.
If the global and local dissident 
groups want to deal with Myanmar’s 
government, opposition and society 
more effectively, they will have to be 
more nuanced and respectful.  The 
first step, as ever, is to stop calling 
Myanmar ‘Burma’ and Yangon 
‘Rangoon’.  Grinding old axes against 
the Myanmar authorities will 
achieve nothing for the boat people. 
Myanmar’s reform pathway is bumpy 
and flawed, but still a substantial 
improvement on conditions and 
prospects in the recent past prior to 
2011.  Evidence from interviews of 
boat people who landed near Aceh 
in Indonesia indicated that many of 
them were from Bangladesh.  Even 
Bangladeshi media openly called 
for its government to do a better job 
of eradicating extreme poverty to 
entice desolate Bangladeshis not to 
leave in the first place.  At one point, 
even Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina 
publicly criticized both middlemen 
traffickers and the Bangladeshi 
immigrants for tainting the 
country’s image.  The narrative of 
the boat people was lopsided and 
more attention needed to focus on 
Bangladesh and what it had done 
and not done to provoke the exodus.
For Malaysia, the issue is as much 
domestic as regional.  As chair of 
the Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), Malaysia could 
not afford to let the crisis of the 
boat people, some of whose remains 
were discovered in mass graves on 
Malaysian soil, derail its regional 
leadership agenda and its chance 
to shine, especially in the launch 
year of the ASEAN Community. 
The ASEAN chairmanship was also 
seen as a means for Prime Minister 
Najib Razak’s to boost his embattled 
domestic political position, through 
countering the  challenges of 
corruption scandals and maneuvers 
within the ruling UMNO party 
of the Barisan Nasional coalition 
government.  Success from ASEAN’s 
regional efforts and the launch of its 
Community aspirations could shore 
up Najib’s standing.  This is why 
Malaysia was more forthcoming 
in allowing detention centres and 
camps to be set up to accommodate 
desperate boat people coming 
ashore.  Moreover, Prime Minister 
Najib himself told a visiting 
delegation of regional Track Two 
representatives that Malaysian 
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industries, particularly its 
agricultural plantations, needed the 
labor the boat people could supply 
but that such an arrangement could 
not be an official policy.
Indonesia’s accommodation was 
also conspicuous.  As the largest 
Muslim country and an up-and-
coming third largest democracy in 
the world, with a freshly elected 
president who wants to prove 
himself worthy at home and not to 
be taken lightly abroad, Indonesia 
could hardly turn a callous eye to 
the predominantly Muslim boat 
people from the Andaman.  For 
Indonesia, it was about the spirit 
and community of Islam as much 
as a humanitarian imperative. 
Because Malaysia and Indonesia 
were in agreement over the boat 
people’s sufferings in May 2015, 
the dire situation was alleviated 
and ameliorated.  The management 
and/or resolution of this issue in 
the future will similarly require 
common purpose between Malaysia 
and Indonesia. 
Thailand was another by-standing 
country with direct stakes. It is 
a notorious transit country that 
has spawned a wide variety of 
transnational crimes and the 
trafficking of migrant labor, drugs, 
and other illicit trades.  The 
intersection between Thailand’s 
status as a transnational crime haven 
and its diplomatic miscalculation in 
deporting Uighur refugees to China 
in July 2015 led to major terrorist 
incident in central Bangkok just 
a month later.  Having provided 
sanctuary and succor to countless 
refugees from war and conflict in 
Indochina in the 1970s and 80s 
and to Myanmar’s minority groups 
fleeing ethnic conflicts, Thailand 
can hardly be accused of cold and 
careless treatment of suffering and 
victimized neighbours. The boat 
people crisis fed into Thailand’s 
own domestic political polarization. 
The more conservative and pro-
coup segments of Thai society 
were inclined against allowing 
the boat people to set foot on Thai 
soil, whereas the other anti-coup 
and pro-election side were more 
sympathetic.  With Malaysia and 
Indonesia more accommodating 
towards the boat people, Thailand’s 
geographical luck came into play. 
Its military government placed 
naval vessels in the sea to provide 
humanitarian supplies and medical 
and other assistance for the boat 
people, while delineating its 
position as a transit and facilitation 
point.  Bangkok also hosted 
an international conference on 
irregular migration attended by 17 
relevant governments and a handful 
of international organizations on 
29 May 2015. Thailand’s military 
regime used its regional role and 
international involvement to 
address the boat people crisis as a 
way of gaining implicit recognition 
from the international community. 
For ASEAN, the stakes were salient 
and substantive.  The ten-member 
grouping initially displayed its 
usual ineffectual stance towards 
the boat people.  But once the self-
interest of the ASEAN chair set in 
and regional peer pressure from 
international prodding mounted, 
ASEAN came round little by little 
toward a more responsive posture. 
It did not go all the way in trying 
to solve the boat people crisis but 
collective ASEAN efforts among 
Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand, 
with discreet personal diplomacy 
and nuanced persuasion, sufficed 
to entice Myanmar to fully take 
part in the 29 May meeting, 
seeking to position solutions for 
the boat people issue in a regional 
framework. What is needed now 
is longer-term international 
backing and commitments for near-
term assistance and longer-term 
resettlement. 
The crisis of the boat people stems 
from a thriving but unregulated 
industry of people smuggling 
underpinned by grim realities and 
entrenched hardships in Myanmar 
and Bangladesh and the absence 
of a wider governance framework. 
ASEAN is limited in what it can do 
because of its own non-interference 
principle and because Bangladesh 
is not an ASEAN member.  But the 
May meeting in Thailand showed 
that regional cooperation and 
governance is viable if efforts and 
commitments were exerted in key 
areas, such as a concerted crackdown 
on human trafficking, for example. 
Since that meeting, not much has 
been done, as the Andaman boat 
people crisis is seasonal.  There may 
well be another upsurge of crisis 
proportions in late 2015 or again 
in April-May 2016 unless regional 
pre-emptive measures are put in 
place.  ASEAN already has a full 
plate.  The regional organization 
has also been weakened by domestic 
political tensions and crises in key 
member states, such as Malaysia, 
Thailand, and Myanmar.  This 
means that capacity for regional 
governance is extremely limited. 
While the ASEAN Economic 
Community beckons by early 2016, 
ASEAN’s momentum is currently 
weak because of member states’ 
domestic challenges, At the same 
time, Bangladesh is a principal 
state in the boat people crisis but 
it is not an ASEAN member.  As a 
result, the boat people crisis is likely 
to be recurrent and intractable 
because it crosses lines of history, 
geography, ethnicity, and religion. 
It is a 21st century imbroglio 
that requires domestic economic 
development, effective regional 
responses, and global attention and 
support.  Domestic shortcomings, 
such as those found in Bangladesh 
and Myanmar, that spill over into 
the regional domain can still be 
managed and  mitigated to preclude 
unconscionable humanitarian costs.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak
Director, Institute of Security 
and International studies, 
Chulalongkorn University.
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CSCAP: Keeping it Alert, Agile and Relevant
Ralph Cossa and Tan Sri Rastam Mohd Isa
As a Track Two organization that 
counts among its 20 Member 
Committees—some of the most 
prominent think-tanks in the Asia 
Pacific—the Council for Security 
Cooperation in the Asia Pacific 
(CSCAP) deliberates contemporary 
and on-the-horizon issues of 
strategic concern and formulates 
policy recommendations for 
consideration by governments in 
the region.  It does this by gathering 
renowned field, policy and academic 
experts to address issues sometimes 
deemed too sensitive for the 
governmental track.  Significantly, 
CSCAP also involves officials 
who participate in their personal 
capacity and add an important 
dimension to the discussions. 
The organization specifically, 
and Track Two more generally, 
are therefore valued not only for 
their substantive prescience and 
confidence-building process but also 
for the cross-fertilization of ideas 
and perspectives in developing 
pragmatic policy recommendations. 
The value of CSCAP
Since its establishment in 1993, 
CSCAP has sought to align its 
research to be responsive to the 
primary challenges in the evolving 
strategic environment and to the 
needs of the ASEAN-led security 
institutions that play a big role 
in it.  The ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF), in particular, has 
been a primary focus of CSCAP’s 
engagement and annual ARF 
Chairman’s Statements in recent 
years have singled out CSCAP’s 
contribution to its deliberations. 
CSCAP memoranda are regularly 
submitted to the ARF Inter-
Sessional Support Group (ISG), 
Inter-Sessional Meeting (ISM) and 
the Senior Officials Meeting (SOM). 
CSCAP Study Group meetings are 
occasionally held back-to-back with 
the relevant and corresponding 
ISG/ISM.  The ARF has in fact 
encouraged this whenever possible 
to help drive the Track One process. 
When this happens, Study Group co-
chairs typically compile a summary 
of key findings and present them 
to the ARF as their own views 
rather than as a consensus CSCAP 
document.  The feed-in process to 
the ARF is additionally facilitated 
by the convenient overlap in 
membership of CSCAP’s experts 
and the ARF Eminent and Expert 
Persons (EEP). 
Besides the ARF, CSCAP has also 
contributed specific expertise to the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) forum, such as when it 
produced a CSCAP memorandum 
on “Managing Trade of Strategic 
Goods”. In addition to driving the 
ARF’s deliberations on strategic 
trade, Memorandum No. 14 was 
used and referred to in the breakout 
sessions of the APEC Conference 
on Facilitating Trade in a Secure 
Trading Environment in Kuala 
Lumpur in October 2013.  Earlier, 
CSCAP provided a draft “Statement 
of Principles for Northeast Asia 
Cooperation” to the Six-Party Talks 
to help build cooperation among its 
participants. 
CSCAP’s members also participate 
in other Track Two processes 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. At this meeting, members 
expressed their confidence in the ASEAN Economic Community. Source: ASEAN, Facebook.
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such as the Network of ASEAN 
Defence and Security Institutions 
(NADI), promoting an exchange 
in perspectives and bridging 
the divide between defence and 
security issues within Track 
Two.  The Secretariat for NADI, 
for example—which supports 
the ASEAN Defence Ministers 
Meeting (ADMM) Plus process—
is manned by CSCAP Singapore’s 
lead institution, the S. Rajaratnam 
School of International Studies. 
Similarly, experts from Malaysia’s 
lead institution in NADI are also 
members of CSCAP Malaysia. 
CSCAP’s engagement with other 
regional strategic frameworks, such 
as the ASEAN Defense Ministers 
Meeting (ADMM) Plus and the 
East Asia Summit (EAS), would 
constitute a natural trajectory for 
its growth and continued relevance.
CSCAP’s activities and 
contributions have generated 
interest in membership beyond the 
Asia-Pacific region, with informal 
queries received from Kazakhstan, 
Nepal and Pakistan as well as a 
formal application from an institute 
in Bangladesh.  While it maintains 
an inclusive outlook on membership, 
CSCAP has, however, prioritized 
enquiries of interest from parties 
within the Asia-Pacific. 
Current focus of CSCAP Study 
Groups
Study Group reports and 
memoranda constitute CSCAP’s 
primary output.  In 2015, there 
were four CSCAP Study Groups 
respectively concerned: with energy 
security; preventive diplomacy; 
non-proliferation and disarmament; 
and harmonization of aeronautical 
and maritime search and rescue. 
A fifth Study Group on maritime 
environment protection was 
approved in September 2015. 
Some of these Study Groups focus 
on issues of continued concern amid 
a changing landscape. Others seek 
to address policy gaps in nascent 
and evolving priorities such as bio-
security. Some of these matters fall 
naturally within the purview of the 
ARF and its Work Plans.  Others 
are taken up by organizations 
like APEC and the ADMM Plus. 
Although the issues addressed 
range across the spectrum of 
non-traditoonal and traditional 
security challenges, they all remain 
pertinent and timely in the regional 
context.  Protection of the marine 
environment, for example, is 
mutually beneficial to all parties—
even, or especially to, claimants to 
disputed territories—because, as 
the ARF recognizes, non-traditional 
security issues can serve as 
important and early building blocks 
for the cultivation of mutual trust, 
confidence and consensus in the 
region. 
Enhancing the value of CSCAP 
and Track Two
While the ARF has been receptive 
to and indeed, welcoming of, 
improved ties with CSCAP, 
several procedural measures 
would enhance its substantive 
engagement.  First, the provision of 
ample advanced notice by the ARF 
of ISG/ISM meetings would enable 
CSCAP to plan and convene back-
to-back meetings more efficiently. 
This would help CSCAP facilitate 
more focused meeting agendas for 
the benefit of the ARF and promote 
greater personal interaction 
between Tracks One and Two on 
specific issues. 
Second, CSCAP-ARF relations might 
be raised to the next level through 
regularized briefings by the CSCAP 
Co-Chairs to ARF senior officials or 
even to ARF leaders.  This would 
narrow the policy gap between 
Tracks One and Two, without 
adding to the bureaucratic layers of 
the former while  directly conveying 
to leaders the candor underpinning 
Track Two discussions and its 
consequent recommendations. 
This might provide especially 
valuable background information 
for governments faced with 
seemingly intractable issues.  Direct 
engagement between ARF and 
CSCAP experts would also bring the 
ASEAN-led framework in line with 
ASEAN’s pledge to be a more people-
centered organization.
Third, CSCAP’s relevance and 
role as a sounding-board for Track 
One in regional security matters 
would be strengthened by greater 
substantive feedback from the 
ARF.  Over the years, CSCAP has 
produced no less than 27 memoranda 
on various security challenges 
confronting the Asia-Pacific.  The 
extent of the ARF’s acceptance of 
CSCAP recommendations varies 
with the agenda of the Chair or 
Co-Chairs of the ARF ISG, ISM 
or SOM.  It also depends on the 
level of relations between CSCAP 
Member Committees and their 
respective governments.  It must 
still be pointed out, however, that 
with the exception of issue-areas 
like confidence-building measures 
and preventive diplomacy, CSCAP’s 
work and publications have 
achieved only modest visibility 
in ARF statements or summary 
reports.  As there are currently 
no mechanisms to evaluate the 
usefulness of CSCAP memoranda 
presented to the ARF and absent 
detailed comments from Track One 
on the recommendations produced 
thus far, CSCAP is unable to fully 
evaluate the value and impact of its 
work.  
ARF feedback on Track Two’s work 
would also be useful to CSCAP’s 
own assessments of the Study 
Group program.  It would enable 
CSCAP as a whole to make more 
informed assessments on whether 
to form new Study Groups or extend 
the tenure of existing ones. Since 
Study Groups require the financial 
and manpower commitment of 
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CSCAP Member Committees, it is 
important that the process does not 
end up eclipsing the outcome and 
that Study Groups avoid replicating 
Track One discussions.  Where 
appropriate, CSCAP should instead 
identify other emerging issues 
to form the basis of future Study 
Groups and to raise consciousness 
among Track One officials. 
CSCAP could return to existing 
areas prioritized by Track One if 
developments suggested that it 
would be fruitful to do so.  
CSCAP’s engagement with ASEAN-
led security institutions should 
also be complemented by greater 
public outreach as many people 
still remain unaware of the work 
done by CSCAP.  The cultivation 
of closer relations with domestic 
stakeholders within each Member 
Committee—government, business, 
academia, media, and civil 
society—is crucial for this purpose 
and for added buy-in to the Track 
Two process.  Where appropriate, 
CSCAP could also act as a conduit 
for other stakeholders and non-
governmental organizations to 
contribute to the Track One process. 
Perhaps what CSCAP must, but 
has yet to sufficiently consider, is 
that in order to engage a wider (and 
younger) audience and publicize its 
analyses more extensively, CSCAP 
must make the technological leap 
and connect digitally, including via 
social media applications.  Hard-
copy memoranda may still have 
a place in certain distribution 
circles but CSCAP publications 
should also be available on Member 
Committee websites and mobile-
enabled for smartphone access. 
Just as CSCAP responds to the 
flux of the geopolitical regional 
environment, so too must it adapt 
its own communication modes to 
match the increasingly wired Asia-
Pacific region. 
We believe that CSCAP has made, 
and continues to make, a significant 
contribution to the security policy 
debate in the Asia-Pacific.  We 
look forward to a continued close 
association with the ARF, even as 
we seek to deepen our involvement 
with the ADMM Plus, EAS and 
other regional organizations.
Ralph Cossa 
Council for Security Cooperation in 
the Asia Pacific, United States.
Tan Sri Rastam Mohd Isa
Council for Security Cooperation in 
the Asia Pacific, United States.
CSCAP Co -Chairs
CSCAP STUDY GROUPS
Study Groups are CSCAP’s primary 
mechanism to generate analysis and policy 
recommendations for consideration by 
governments. These groups serve as fora for 
consensus building and problem solving and 
to address sensitive issues and problems 
ahead of their consideration in official 
processes. Recently launched study groups:
• Non-proliferation and disarmament
• Energy security
• Preventive diplomacy
• Harmonising air and sea SAR
Recently concluded study groups:
• Regional Security Architecture
• Countering the Proliferation of Weapons  
of Mass Destruction in the Asia Pacific
• Principle of Good Order at Sea
• Preventive Diplomacy
CSCAP MEMBER COMMITTEES
CSCAP membership includes almost all of 
the major countries of the Asia Pacific and 
also includes the European Union:
Australia
Brunei
Cambodia
Canada
China
European Union
India
Indonesia
Japan
Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea
Republic of Korea
Malaysia
Mongolia
New Zealand
The Philippines
Russia
Singapore
Thailand
United States of America
Vietnam
Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (Associate 
Member)
CSCAP PUBLICATIONS
CRSO Regional Security Outlook (CRSO)
The CRSO is an annual publication to highlight regional 
security issues and to promote and inform policy-
relevant outputs as to how Track One (official) and 
Track Two (non official) actors can, jointly or separately, 
advance regional multilateral solutions to these issues.
CSCAP Memoranda
CSCAP Memoranda are the outcome of the work of 
Study Groups approved by the Steering Committee and 
submitted for consideration at the Track One level. 
CSCAP General Conference Reports 
Since 1997, the biennial CSCAP General Conference, 
is designed to be an international forum where high 
ranking officials and security experts from the Asia 
Pacific region meet every two years to discuss security 
issues of relevance and to seek new ideas in response 
to evolving developments in Asia Pacific security. 
The forum is usually attended by approximately 250 
participants; making it one of the largest gatherings of 
its kind.
Through its publications, CSCAP’s recommendations 
have been well received by the ARF.

